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0 Executive Summary 
The draft Second National Allocation Plans (NAPs) of Germany, the United Kingdom, 
and the Netherlands have been assessed based on the questions of whether these 
NAPs ensure meeting the respective national commitments under the Kyoto Protocol in 
the short term and whether they stimulate the development and the diffusion of low 
carbon intensive technologies to meet larger emission cuts in the longer term. 
In short, these draft NAPs place a disproportionate burden for emissions reductions on 
the non-ETS sectors in terms of meeting the countries respective commitments under 
EU Burden Sharing agreement to meet the targets in the Kyoto Protocol. This effec-
tively lets the industries covered off the hook, and places an extra burden on the 
transport, commercial, household, and other sectors not covered by the ETS. While 
each of the countries in question is likely to meet its Kyoto targets, they are not effec-
tively using the system to drive emissions reductions in the sectors covered by the ETS 
in the short term. Likewise, the three MS are not using the system effectively to guide 
long-term investments in clean technologies required to meet the rigorous climate tar-
gets in the medium term (2020) or longer term (2050). For the EU long-term emission 
reductions of 80 % are considered necessary to keep global mean temperature rise 
below 2° C above pre-industrial levels.  
The main results of this report may briefly be summarized as follows:  
Short term 
With respect to the short-term emission targets for 2008-2012, data from the latest Na-
tional Inventory Reports for 2006 considered alongside the Draft NAPs suggest that:  
• In Germany greenhouse gas emissions were reduced significantly between 1990 
and 1998  partly due to the so called wall-fall profits, i.e. the reconstruction and 
modernization of the energy and industrial systems of the former East Germany. 
Since then, however, emissions have been increasing in the power sector, and 
stagnating overall. Germany appears to be on a path to meet its Burden-Sharing 
target through domestic measures, but additional efforts are now required to close 
the remaining gap of 3.5 %.  
• In the UK, also due to special circumstances in the early 1990s, significant reduc-
tions in greenhouse gas emissions have been achieved. The liberalization of the 
energy markets has led to a "dash for gas" in the power sector. Since then, total 
emissions in UK have been relatively stable and the UK is clearly on track to meet 
its Burden-Sharing target on its own. 
• For the Netherlands, current CO2 emission levels higher than in 1990, and the Bur-
den Sharing Target can only be met by significant reductions of non CO2 emissions 
and by relying heavily on the use of the Flexible Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol: 
50 % of the reductions needed to achieve the Burden Sharing Target will need to 
be paid for by the Dutch state, purchasing credits from JI and CDM-projects. If 
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prices for ERUs and CERs continue to increase, this budget will have to be ad-
justed upwards.  
 
Longer term 
With respect to the mid-term and long-term emission reduction target of 30% and 80%, 
our extrapolation analyses imply:  
• For emission reductions of -30% by 2020 and -80% by 2050, Germanys hypo-
thetical ETS emissions target would be approx. 400 Mt CO2e/a by 2020 (or 345 Mt 
CO2e/a to meet the national -40 % target) and around 115 Mt CO2e/a by 2050; the 
ETS-emission target of the UK would be around 200 Mt CO2e/a in 2020 and roughly 
55 Mt CO2e/a in 2050, and the Netherlandss hypothetical ETS emissions target for 
2020 would be about 55 Mt CO2e/a by 2020 and some 15 Mt CO2e/a by 2050. The 
hypothetical ETS target assumes equi-proportional emission reductions in all sec-
tors.1 
• If emissions continue to develop as in the recent past, Germany, the UK and the 
Netherlands will be far from achieving their mid-term or even long-term indicative 
reduction targets. 
• The emission targets implied at the macro level of the NAPs suggest that Germany, 
the UK and the Netherlands did not use the NAPs to lead their economies on a re-
duction path towards these mid-term or long-term targets. To get there, they would 
have to be significantly more ambitious.  
• The analyses on the ambition levels of the ET-budget for the Draft NAPs for 2008-
2012 show that Germany and The Netherlands decrease the ET-budget for the 
second phase compared to the first phase, but the implied reduction for Germany is 
rather small. The UK and The Netherlands decrease the ET-budget compared to 
projected emissions of the ET-installations; if the projected growth rates turn out to 
be correct, the implied reduction is about 10 % for the UK and about 16% for The 
Netherlands. The experience in the case of Germany, which did not provide projec-
tions for emissions and ended with a rather large surplus allocation in 2005, high-
lights the importance of also using emission projections to determine the size of the 
ET-budget. Thus, Germany should also provide emission projections for NAP 2. 
 
                                                
1  The hypothetical emission targets are based on verified emission data for 2005 for installa-
tions included in the first phase of the EU ETS. Since this data does not include emissions 
from opt-out installations in the first phase and additional installations joining the EU ETS in 
the second phase, these targets tend to (slightly) underestimate the hypothetical burden 
sharing target of the ETS sector in 2008-12. 
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Improving the NAPs 
• Regarding ETS-Non ETS split: in all three MS the budgets for the ET-sectors are too 
high, particularly in Germany. Thus, compared to the optimal split, the current budg-
ets benefit companies with ET-installations at the expense of the other sectors (pri-
vate households, transport), and overall reduction costs for society are too high. 
From an economic perspective, the size of the budgets for the ET-sector and the 
non-ET-sector should be determined such that (before international trading starts) 
the total abatement costs are minimized, i.e. that the marginal costs of the abate-
ment measures which are realized in the trading sectors and the non-trading sec-
tors are equal. Thus, sectors with cheaper reduction measures should contribute 
more reductions (relatively) to achieving the emission target. Of the three countries 
analyzed, the UK appears to be closest to an optimal split, but a final judgement is 
difficult without verified emissions data for all installations included in the second 
phase. 
• The analyses and arguments developed in this report suggest that  although some 
improvement in the NAPs is noticeable  there are still many allocation rules in 
the Draft NAPs for Germany, the Netherlands and the UK which reflect attempts 
made to use the EU ETS for distributional effects and to preserve existing energy 
structures. These rules often result in negative effects such as increased costs of 
climate protection, shifting the burden of emissions' reduction to operators of instal-
lations not benefiting from special provisions, or to a transfer of wealth and windfall 
profits. 
• With respect to the aims of this project, the analyses carried out and the arguments 
presented show that there is still ample room to increase the ambition level of the 
Draft NAPs of Germany, the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent, the UK. This holds 
true for both the macro level, i.e., the overall budget, as well as for the micro level, 
that is, the design of the rules governing the allocation of allowances.  
 
General Recommendations 
Based on the arguments derived from economic theory and from empirical evidence, 
the following is being recommended for the future design of NAPs under the EU ETS: 
• In the long run all allowances should be auctioned off.  
• For the trading period of 2008-2012 Member States should set the share of allow-
ances to be auctioned off at the maximum level allowed by the Emissions Trading 
Directive, i.e., at 10% of the total budget. 
• Auctioning allowances would reduce windfall profits and would be expected to 
.have the same effects on output prices as free allocation. 
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• To address early action and provide incentives for replacement of inefficient tech-
nologies gratis allocation for existing installations should be based on product-
specific benchmarks for sufficiently homogenous product groups. 
• Undifferentiated benchmarks for existing installations would provide the highest 
incentives for the replacement of inefficient technologies. 
• Allocating allowances for free to new projects amounts to subsidizing output and 
increases overall costs to achieve emission reduction targets for society. 
• New projects should acquire the necessary allowances at market prices. 
• If new projects receive allowances for free, allocation should be based on BAT-
benchmarks and standardized load factors.   
• Differentiating benchmarks or load factors (e.g. by technologies or fuels) results in 
distorted incentives for innovation, subsidies for particular technologies or fuels and 
eventually higher overall reduction costs for society. 
• Rather than providing planning security for investments via long-term gratis alloca-
tion rules for new projects, governments should signal future scarcity of emission 
allowances by setting credible long-term emission targets. 
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1 Introduction and overview 
On 1 January 2005, the European Union launched an EU-wide trading system (EU 
ETS) for CO2 emissions, covering approximately 11,000 installations from the energy 
industry and other carbon-intensive industry sectors. These installations account for 
nearly 45% of total CO2 emissions, and about 30% of all greenhouse gases in the EU 
(CEC 2005a). As its key climate policy instrument, the EU expects the EU ETS to help 
its Member States (MS) cost-efficiently fulfil their obligations under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol and the Burden-
Sharing Agreement (CEC 2001). In the Kyoto Protocol, the EU has committed to reduc-
ing emissions of the greenhouse gases CO2, CH4, N2O, SF6, PFCs and HFCs by 8%, 
compared to base year levels, by 2008-2012.2 In the subsequent Burden-Sharing 
Agreement, the EU 15-member target was broken down into targets for individual 
Member States. The average reduction target for the new Member States is slightly 
below 8%. The first trading period of the EU ETS, considered a learning phase, lasts 
from 2005 to 2007. The second trading period runs for five years  as do all subse-
quent periods   and thus coincides with the 2008-2012 Kyoto commitment period. 
Rationale for using emissions trading to address climate change 
The primary purpose of using an emissions trading system to address climate changes 
is cost-efficiency  achieving a given emission target at minimum cost. The cost of 
reducing emissions will eventually be reflected in the market price of EU emission al-
lowances (EUAs), inducing demand for innovative, energy/carbon saving processes, 
products and services. This increased demand will in turn lead to more research and 
development (R&D), and the invention, adoption and market diffusion of such innova-
tions (dynamic efficiency).3 In contrast to other environmental instruments, emissions 
trading systems also assure that a particular environmental target is met. Since the 
quantity of allowances allocated (emissions cap) corresponds to the emission target for 
a particular period, the amount of greenhouse gases emitted may not be higher than 
the number of allowances allocated (apart from sanctions). For these reasons, emis-
sions trading is often considered superior to other regulations.4 The rate and direction 
of the technological change generated by the EU ETS depends on the design of the 
scheme. The design of the EU ETS is governed by the EU Emissions Trading Directive 
2003/87/EC (CEC 2003b), as well as by the National Allocation Plans (NAPs) of indi-
vidual Member States. 
 
                                                
2  The base year for CO2, CH4 and N2O is 1990; for SF6, HFCs and PFCs it is 1995. 
3  In this sense, emissions trading is also said to represent a demand-oriented regulation  
in contrast to supply-oriented regulation, like subsidies for R&D. 
4  See, for example, a recent literature survey by ZEW (Oberndorfer et al. 2006). 
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The role of National Allocation Plans in the EU Emissions Trading System 
National allocation plans (NAPs) are the centrepiece of the EU ETS: at the macro level, 
NAPs state the total quantity of allowances available in each period (ETS budget); at 
the micro level, they determine how these allowances will be allocated to individual 
installations. Because the MS differ considerably in terms of their Kyoto/burden-sharing 
emission targets, reduction potentials and progress made so far, the Directive leaves it 
up to the individual MS to decide how to meet their emission targets. At the macro 
level, the NAPs determine to what extent the individual MS may rely on the EU ETS to 
achieve their emission targets. That is, NAPs establish how to split the pie: How many 
allowances should be allocated to the installations covered by the EU ETS (trading 
sectors), and what are the expected emissions from installations not covered by the EU 
ETS (non-trading sectors)? NAPs need to be approved by the European Commission, 
and the deadline for submission is 30 June 2006 for the second trading period (2008-
2012). According to the Directive, national governments must give the general public 
an opportunity to express their views and comment on draft versions of the NAPs prior 
to submission (CEC 2006a). Once submitted, the European Commission has three 
months for the approval process, providing MS three months at the end of 2006 to draft 
their final NAPs. 
Criteria from the Directive to assess NAPs  
The Commission will assess NAPs based partially on the following criteria:5 
• Consistency with the MS EU Burden-Sharing Agreement and national climate 
change programmes (Criterion 1); 
• Consistency with assessments of historical and projected emission trends to-
wards achieving the required emission targets (Criterion 2); 
• Consistency with potential to reduce emissions (Criterion 3); 
• Not discriminating against nor favouring certain companies or sectors (Criterion 
5); 
• Information on treatment of new entrants (Criterion 6); 
• Information on how clean technologies are taken into account (Criterion 8); 
• Due account to comments made by the public (Criterion 9);  
                                                
5  Criteria (1) to (6) are given in Annex III of the Emissions Trading Directive (CEC 2003b), 
together with other criteria not mentioned here to save space. The last criterion results from 
Article 30 of the Directive 2003/87/EC (CEC 2003b) in combination with the  Linking Direc-
tive 2004/101/EC (CEC 2004b). 
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• Consistency with MS supplementarity obligations under the Kyoto Protocol for 
the maximum number of CERs and ERUs which may be used by operators to 
cover CO2 emissions in the EU ETS.6 The use of the EU ETS is in itself re-
garded as a domestic (intra-EU) measure. 
The Commission subsequently published non-binding guidelines on how it will interpret 
these criteria when assessing NAPs (CEC 2004a p.5, CEC 2005b). In particular, for the 
first period (20052007), when no international targets exist, the ETS budget is re-
quired to correspond to a reduction path which is intended to be a trend line, not nec-
essarily a straight one, but one that is leading towards or goes beyond achieving the 
burden-sharing target.7 
Cost efficient size of budget for ET-sector 
From an economic perspective, the size of the budgets for the ET-sector and the non-
ET-sector should be determined such that (before international trading starts) the total 
abatement costs are minimized, i.e., the marginal costs of the abatement measures 
which are realized in the trading sectors and the non-trading sectors are equal. Thus, 
sectors with cheaper reduction measures should contribute more reductions (relatively) 
to achieving the emission target. At least to some extent, criterion 3  potential to re-
duce emissions  addresses this issue. According to the NAP Guidance (2004), this 
criterion will be deemed as fulfilled if the allocation reflects the relative differences in 
the potential between the total covered and total non-covered activities, where poten-
tial also means economic, and not only technical, potential. 
Medium- and long-term targets for climate policy 
Since climate change is a long-term policy challenge, the NAPs should also be consis-
tent with the long-term international and national emission reduction targets.  The EU 
Council considers greenhouse gas emission reductions of 15-30% (compared to 1990 
levels) by 2020 a necessary mid-term target for industrialized countries in order to limit 
the mean global temperature increase by the end of the century to 2° Celsius com-
pared to pre-industrialized levels (European Council 2005). Taking into account pro-
jected emission growth in developing countries, a recent report by the German Federal 
Environmental Agency, among others, requires even more stringent long-term targets: 
80% reductions by 2050 for the group of developed countries (Federal Environmental 
                                                
6 All Kyoto ratifying countries have committed themselves to fulfil part of the Kyoto target 
domestically. However, the definition of this so-called supplementarity is more qualitative 
than quantitative. In the Marrakesh Accords, the following wording is used: "the use of 
the mechanisms shall be supplemental to domestic action and that domestic action shall 
thus constitute a significant element of the effort made by each Party included in Annex 
I" (UNFCCC 2001). 
7 Subsequently, the EC approval process for the first round has led to substantial cuts in the 
ETS budgets for several MS, including a 3% cut (from 99.3 to 95.3 Mt) for the Netherlands.  
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Agency Germany 2006). This coincides with the upper range of the long-term recom-
mendations of the March 2005 Environment Council (European Council 2005), which 
considers reductions by developed countries of 60-80% to be consistent with the EU 2-
degree target. 
Box: EU Emissions trading and incentives for innovation  
Under the EU emissions trading plan, national governments allocate a certain absolute 
number of CO2-emission allowances (EUAs) to installations operators per year.8 The 
allocation decision is made for the entire trading period; allowances are issued each 
year. Operators have to surrender the number of allowances equivalent to the amount 
of CO2-emissions caused by their installations during the previous year. Otherwise, 
sanctions have to be paid and missing allowances surrendered in the following year.9 
This is crucial for the integrity and functioning of the scheme. Operators of installations 
whose emissions are lower than their allocated allowances  because, for example, 
they invested in energy-efficient equipment  may sell their surplus allowances to 
those operators who have only high-cost abatement measures available, and therefore 
require additional allowances to cover surplus emissions. Ideally, a cap and trade 
approach ensures that emissions are reduced where it is cheapest to do so, and that 
the market price for EUAs reflects the scarcity of allowances in the system. Eventually, 
the market mechanism ensures that all participants face the same marginal abatement 
costs so that overall reduction costs are minimized (static efficiency). According to 
standard economic theory, under ideal conditions (absence of market power, perfect 
information), the price of EUAs will be independent of the initial distribution of allow-
ances among participants. Similarly, the price of EUAs is independent of whether al-
lowances are allocated for free or auctioned off.10  
The market price should not only reflect the marginal abatement costs, but also set 
monetary incentives to adopt new, more energy-efficient technologies with lower emis-
sions (dynamic efficiency). These investments either free up emission allowances 
which may be sold at the market price, or they allow installations operators to avoid 
having to purchase allowances at that price. Because of these additional revenues/cost 
savings, emissions trading should lead to direct innovation effects in the form of the 
accelerated diffusion of new energy-efficient technologies (Tietenberg 1985, p. 33). At 
the same time, there are additional incentives for R&D in such technologies.11 Clearly, 
the relevance of emissions trading for innovation crucially hinges on the market price 
                                                
8 One allowance (EUA) gives the right to emit one tonne of CO2. 
9 For the first trading period (2005-2007), these sanctions are 40  per missing EUA; in the 
second trading period (2008-2012), they are 100 .  
10 In an auction, the bids of the participants lead to the outcome that marginal abatement 
costs are equal across all participants. 
11 Of course, the costs for emissions are only one of many determinants of innovation. 
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for allowances. The higher the price for allowances, the higher are the incentives for 
R&D, invention, adoption and diffusion in energy-efficient technologies. 
If the additional costs of covering CO2 emissions are passed on and included in the 
product (e.g. electricity) prices, emissions trading may also induce indirect innovation 
effects on the demand side where these products are used as inputs (e.g. energy-
intensive industries like the aluminium industry, but also private households). The rele-
vance of these indirect effects depends on the extent to which the additional costs for 
CO2-emissions can be passed on, as well as on the cost-share of those inputs. Thus, 
the innovation effects of emissions trading are not limited to the companies directly 
covered by the scheme.12 
Purpose of this report  
As part of their campaign to strengthen the ambition level of EU emissions trading, 
Greenpeace International asked Fraunhofer Institute Systems and Innovation Re-
search (Fraunhofer ISI), Karlsruhe, Germany, in cooperation with the Centre for Energy 
and Environmental Markets (CEEM) at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, 
Australia and Jos Cozijnsen, consulting attorney on emissions trading, Utrecht, the 
Netherlands, to assess the early draft Second National Allocation Plans.13 The short 
timeframe allowed the assessment of Draft NAPs for only three Member States: Ger-
many, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. The analysis focuses on the following 
key questions: 
• Do the NAPs ensure that the national commitments under the Kyoto Protocol 
will be met? 
• Do the NAPs stimulate the development and diffusion of low carbon-intensive 
technologies? 
This report will identify where the Draft NAPs could work more ambitiously to meet the 
long-term climate targets and design allocation rules that would allow the EU ETS to 
achieve those emission targets at low costs to society.  
Methodology and Outline  
Summaries of the actual 2008-2012 Draft NAPs for Germany, the UK and the Nether-
lands are presented together with the NAPs for 2005-2007 in Annex A. Based on the 
Draft NAPs for 2008-2012:  
                                                
12  For an assessment of the innovation and efficiency aspects of the NAPs for the EU MS in 
the first trading period, see Schleich and Betz (2005). For a more general treatment of in-
novation effects in the EU ETS, see Gagelmann and Frondel (2005). 
13  The authors of this report are thankful to valuable assistance by Johanna Cludius, Alejan-
dra Sáez de la Fuente, Frieder Frasch and Michael Ruf.  
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• Section 2 presents the macro plans and the associated budgets for the installa-
tions covered by the Directive (ET-budget). To evaluate the MS progress to-
wards meeting their burden-sharing targets, Distance-to-Target (DTT) analysis 
is conducted. The NAPs are also evaluated in relation to medium-term and 
long-term climate policy targets. To assess the ambition levels of the ET-
budgets for the second NAP, they are compared with verified emissions in 
2005, with projected emissions for 2010 and with the size of the ET-budget for 
the first phase. In addition, the split of the required reductions between sectors 
is evaluated from a cost-effectiveness perspective. The outcomes of the verified 
emissions data (VAT) for the installations covered by the EU ETS for the year 
2005 together with results on sector-specific analyses of surplus and shortages 
are presented in Annex B. 
• Section 3 presents crucial allocation rules at the micro level of the NAPs and 
explores their implications for innovation, relying primarily on insights from basic 
economic theory. The rules considered are methods of allocation for existing in-
stallations and new projects, closure rules and the treatment of clean technolo-
gies.  
• The concluding Section 4 then draws on the analyses presented in the previous 
sections and identifies areas where the NAPs for Germany, the UK and the 
Netherlands could be more ambitious in terms of meeting climate targets and 
implementing more efficient allocation rules. 
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2 Quantitative analysis of Draft NAPs for 2008-12 at 
the macro level 
The EU emissions trading scheme is the climate policy instrument at the centre of the 
European Unions fight against climate change. In the 2005-2007 first phase of the EU 
ETS,14 almost 2.2 billion EUAs are allocated each year to participants in the scheme, 
covering approximately 45% of the EUs CO2 emissions, or around 30% of its overall 
greenhouse gas emissions (CEC 2005a). But the scheme will only contribute to the 
EUs effort in reaching its Kyoto reduction target of -8% compared to greenhouse gas 
emissions in the 1990/95 base period if Member States set stringent caps that are in 
line with their individual burden-sharing targets. In order to judge whether this is the 
case, the ETS budget needs to be compared to the burden-sharing target and Member 
States distance from achieving this target.  
We start our quantitative NAP assessment by looking at Member States burden-
sharing commitments, and progress toward achieving them so far. For our quantitative 
analysis, we use, whenever possible, greenhouse gas (GHG) data from the UNFCC 
national inventory reports of 2006 (UNFCCC 2006), with the most recent year being 
2004. We always consider GHG emissions, excluding Land-Use Change & Forestry 
(LULUCF). Figure 1 shows the burden-sharing targets of Germany, the UK and the 
Netherlands (green bars: -21%, -12.5% and -6%, respectively), and how far they are 
from achieving this 2008-2012 target (yellow bars). In 2004, Germany and the Nether-
lands still had to further reduce their GHG emissions by -3.5% and -8.3%, respectively, 
while the UK had already met its target: the UKs 2004 GHG emissions were 1.3% be-
low its base year emissions. When adding the intended governmental use of Kyoto 
mechanisms (KM), such as CDM and JI credits, this distance-to-target (DTT) figure 
improves for the Netherlands. While Germany and the UK intend to achieve their bur-
den-sharing target by domestic action only, the Netherlands plans to buy KM credits 
offsetting approximately 20 Mt CO2e/a of its yearly GHG emissions in the Kyoto period 
(Draft NAPs of Member States 2006). This figure is equivalent to 9.5% of the Dutch 
burden-sharing target, therefore increasing the Dutch target from 200.2 Mt CO2e/a to 
about 220 Mt CO2e/a in 2008-2012. Taking this number into consideration when calcu-
lating the distance-to-target in 2004, the Netherlands would have already reached its 
burden- sharing target (+1.2%), as demonstrated in the red bar in Figure 1. These fig-
ures need to be kept in mind when assessing the ambition level of the proposed caps 
for the second phase of the EU ETS. 
                                                
14 The words phase or trading period are used interchangeably in the report when referring 
to the periods 2005-2007 and 2008-2012, for which National Allocation Plans have yet to 
be developed.  
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Figure 1:  Comparative analysis of Kyoto burden sharing and distance-to-target in 
2004 of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany 
 
Source:  Fraunhofer ISI, based on UNFCCC national inventory reports 2006 (NIR/CRF) of UK, 
NL and GER 
The 15 May 2006 release of the emissions data (verified emissions tables  VET) of 
the EU ETS installations in 2005 (VET 2005) showed that the majority of Member 
States had set a generous cap (CEC 2006c) (see also Annex B of this report). The UK 
was one of the few countries for which total 2005 emissions by ET-installations were 
lower than the total allocated quantities of EUAs. Figure 2 shows that the amount of 
allowances allocated in 200515 was 15.8% below the actual emissions of UK installa-
tions covered by the EU ETS in 2005, or about -33 Mt CO2e/a, indicating a stringent 
cap. On the other side, 2005 emissions of German and Dutch installations were below 
the amount allocated to them in 2005 (4.3% and 7%, respectively). This figure could 
still change for Germany, who intends to make ex-post corrections of its allocations to a 
number of installations, e.g. those who applied f according to the option rule where 
allocation is based on specific emission values (benchmarks) and projected output. 
However, this potential reduction  amounting to about half of the excess allocation  
                                                
15  This figure does not include the new entrants reserve, or amounts set aside for opted-out 
installations. 
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will only be applied if Germany wins a court case against the EU Commission, who 
have forbidden any kind of ex-post adjustments to allocations. 
Figure 2:  Comparison of EU ETS allocation for 2005 to actual emissions of EU ETS 
installations in 2005 
Comparison of ETS 2005 allocation with VET 2005 data
4.3% 
-15.8% 
7.0% 
-20% -15% -10% -5% 0% 5% 10%
Germany
UK
Netherlands
Overallocation in 2005?  
Source:  Fraunhofer ISI, based on Draft NAPs II and NAPs I of GER, UK and NL as well as VET 
of 2005 (CEC 2006c)  
2.1 Ambition level of ETS caps for the NAP 2008-2012 
Assessing the stringency of the caps Member States proposed for the second phase of 
the EU ETS is not as straightforward as comparing actual allocation and emissions 
data for 2005. This is the case because data are not always complete and still subject 
to change. However, there are a number of criteria that help to evaluate the stringency 
of the ETS budget for 2008-2012. The numbers calculated based on these criteria are 
only indicative, and need to be interpreted with caution, but some general conclusions 
can be drawn from such an early assessment. 
1. ETS emissions in 2005  
First, the ETS cap can be compared to historic emissions of the trading sector. There 
are two sets of historic data that might be used for such a comparison: ETS sector CO2 
emissions in the country-specific base period (numbers taken from NAPs), or the actual 
emissions of installations covered by the EU ETS. We decided to use the 2005 VET 
data of the EU ETS installations, as these numbers can be better compared, are all 
14 
verified and likely to be of better quality than some of the data for the base year emis-
sions on which Member States based their Draft NAPs. (For example, Germany is still 
in the process of compiling 2003 and 2004 emissions data for its base period of 2000-
2005, and therefore figures in the Draft NAP only cover data for the old base period of 
2000-2002.) Additionally, VET data for 2005 are available for all three countries, are 
most up-to-date and allow for the most objective comparison, since they do not rely on 
Member State-specific base periods (which may differ, e.g., 2000-2003 for the UK, and 
2000-2005 for Germany and the Netherlands, where the UK and the Netherlands allow 
companies to pick three years out of these periods). However, there is one major ca-
veat in comparing the 2005 VET data with the cap for the EU ETS for 2008-12: The 
VET 2005 data do not incorporate the extension of the scope of the EU ETS. Most 
Member States will include additional installations in the second trading period in an 
effort to harmonize the applied definition of combustion installation.16 Also, the UK and 
the Netherlands have applied opt-out rules in the first phase, so that their VET 2005 
data do not reflect the emissions of installations that are temporarily excluded from the 
scheme, but will need to be included in phase 2, since the EU ETS Directive does not 
foresee the option of opt-outs beyond 2007. Therefore, in order to obtain reliable re-
sults, we adjusted the VET 2005 data in two ways: First, we added the reported 2005 
emissions of potential, additional installations (see figures in NAP tables), even though 
they are estimates subject to change. Of course, we only did so if the caps for phase 2, 
as stated in the Draft NAPs, already incorporated the amount of allowances to be allo-
cated to additional installations (e.g., in the UK the cap 2 is 252 MtCO2e/a, which in-
cludes opt-out installations but excludes additional installations, with which the cap 
could increase up to 261 MtCO2e/a). Secondly, we corrected the VET 2005 figures by 
adding emissions of opt-out installations, as they are incorporated in the NAPs of the 
UK and the Netherlands. We did this by comparing the foreseen 2005 yearly allocation 
(stated in the NAPs) with the actual 2005 allocation (stated in CEC 2006c), taking out 
the new entrants reserve. Of course, it is not certain whether actual emissions of opt-
out installations are smaller than, bigger than or about the same as their original, pro-
jected 2005 allocation. Therefore, this method provides only an estimate of their 2005 
emissions. Finally, since there might not have been many new entrants in 2005 and our 
second step excluded the unused New Entrants Reserve (NER) of 2005, we also ex-
cluded the new entrants reserve from the ETS phase 2 cap. The aforementioned data 
limitations should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. 
2. ETS budget of previous phase (2005-2007) 
                                                
16  The NAP guidance for the second phase states that [i]n order to remove inconsistencies in 
the second trading period, all Member States should therefore in any case include also 
combustion processes involving crackers, carbon black, flaring, furnaces and integrated 
steelworks, typically carried out in larger installations causing considerable emissions 
(CEC 2005b, p.9). 
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A second criterion for assessing the size of the ETS budget is a comparison between 
the proposed cap for the second phase and the cap of the first phase. Though similar 
to a comparison between the phase 2 cap and 2005 emissions, comparing the first and 
second phase caps is another useful method of assessing whether the ambition level 
of the ETS is increasing. We do this by taking the caps for phase 1 and 2 (each includ-
ing the reserve for new entrants). Both caps should equally incorporate the foreseen 
allocation levels for both 2005-2007 opt-in and opt-out installations (the latter is only 
relevant for the UK and the Netherlands, the former only for the Netherlands), but 
should either exclude 2008-2012 new opt-ins or adjust the cap for phase 1 by these 
additional emissions (only relevant for the Netherlands). Also, if the cap for phase 2 
already includes the allocation to additional installations, we adjusted the cap 1 figure 
by the specified 2005 emissions level for these installations, thereby making both fig-
ures match (necessary only for Germany and the Netherlands, as the UK cap does not 
yet incorporate the allocation to additional installations).  Additional installations will be 
included in all three Member States due to the efforts to harmonize the definition of 
combustion installations, but also due to additional 2008-2012 opt-ins (e.g., N2O in the 
Netherlands, whose allocation, though, is not yet incorporated in the cap for the second 
trading period; additional installations allocation in the UK are also not yet incorporated 
in its phase 2 cap).  It needs to be noted that this is a rough estimate of the adjusted 
cap for phase 1 because we do not correct the estimated 2005 emissions of these ad-
ditional installations by the compliance factor used in phase 1. Therefore, the numbers 
need to be interpreted with caution, but can be seen as indicative figures. 
3. ETS emissions projection 2010 
A third way to assess the ETS cap for 2008-2012 is by comparing it with emissions 
projections for the ETS sector for the second trading period. This criterion is also in line 
with the allocation method most Member States allocation method, which is based on 
projections for the ETS sector.  However, projection data are not always included in the 
NAPs. In order to make a comparison based on this criterion, we estimated the ETS 
sector projection for the Netherlands based on its 2010 projection for all GHG, and mul-
tiplied this number by the ETS sectors CO2 emissions share (VET 2005 data) relative 
to the total GHG emissions for the Netherlands, using the most recent data for 2004 
(National Inventory Reports to the UNFCCC 2006, UNFCCC 2006). We further as-
sumed that this ratio will remain constant. This is a typical assumption, also used by 
many Member States in their NAPs. However, it should be noted that with the inclusion 
of additional installations, activities and gases (such as N2O in the Netherlands), the 
share of the trading sectors GHG emissions relative to total GHG emissions is likely to 
increase, thereby increasing its projection, as well. While the determination of the ETS 
ratio is a crude estimate, it is still useful to look at these figures, taking them as the 
closest possible proxy. Unfortunately, Germany there is no recent projection for Ger-
many, and therefore criterion 3 is only applied to the UK and the Netherlands. Their 
projections are compared to the proposed cap for the second trading phase. 
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4. Hypothetical burden-sharing budget of ETS 2010 
While the first three criteria address the direction of the cap compared to past emis-
sions and policy as well as future emissions, the fourth criterion is the only one that 
provides insights into the ETS sector contribution to a Member States Kyoto burden-
sharing target. This is done by comparing the cap with the hypothetical emissions tar-
get for the ETS sector for the Kyoto period 2008-2012. We obtain this hypothetical ETS 
burden sharing target by multiplying a Member States burden-sharing target (all GHG, 
but excluding LULUCF [UNFCCC 2006 National Inventory data for 2004]) with the ETS 
sectors share of total GHG emissions. This ratio is determined using the most current 
2004/2005 data: the ETS sectors CO2 emissions (CEC 2006c) are divided by the total 
GHG emissions of a country. The same caveats stated above apply when using this 
ratio: We assume it is constant over time, and 2004/2005 data are thought sufficiently 
comparable. 17 The same procedure can be applied to calculate a proportional sectoral 
distribution of the burden-sharing target among different sectors. In our analysis, we 
are distinguishing criterion 4 as a scenario with domestic action only, and one including 
a Member States intended use of Kyoto mechanisms in fulfilling its target: 
a. Without governmental use of Kyoto mechanisms 
In the domestic action scenario we calculate the hypothetical ETS BS target 
without the intended governmental use of Kyoto mechanisms. 
b. With governmental use of Kyoto mechanisms 
In a second scenario we incorporate Member States planned purchases of 
CERs, ERUs and/or AAUs to meet their Kyoto burdens sharing targets. As a 
consequence, the hypothetical ETS BS target increases as well. This is only 
relevant to the Netherlands, as both Germany and UK intend to reach their 
burden-sharing target domestically. 
All four criteria should be interpreted as first impressions of the ambition level of the 
ETS cap for the second trading period. The calculations will need to be updated once 
allocation data are confirmed and data uncertainties of opt-out and opt-in, as well as 
additional installations, can be eliminated. Furthermore, once the GHG emissions of 
the ETS sector with its expanded scope become available for 2005, the ratio of the 
ETS sectors emissions compared to total GHG emissions should be updated. The 
                                                
17  In particular, a more accurate hypothetical BS target for the ETS installations would have to 
also account for emissions by installations which will be added to the set of installations 
covered by the EU ETS in the second phase. However, no verified data on recent emis-
sions by these installations is available. The same rationale applies for previously opted out 
installations whose emissions are not included in VET 2005 data. Therefore, the ratio of 
ETS to all GHG will increase and therefore also the hypothetical burden sharing target for 
the ETS sector. The general statements, though, still hold. 
17 
same is true once the total GHG emissions data for 2005 become available. With these 
limitations in mind, Figure 3 provides insight into the proposed ETS budgets for the 
NAP IIs of Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands; it shows the results of 
the application of the four assessment criteria. 
Figure 3:  Preliminary comparative analysis of caps of the EU ETS phase 2 
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Source:  Fraunhofer ISI, based on Draft NAPs II and NAP I of UK, NL and GER, VET of 2005 
ETS emissions data (CEC 2006c) 
1. ETS emissions in 2005 (orange bar): All three Member States decreased their ETS 
caps compared to the actual ETS CO2 emissions in 2005, although Germanys re-
duction is relatively small (Germany -3.5%, the UK -10.4% and the Netherlands -
11.4%).  
2. ETS budget of previous phase 2005-2007 (green bar): The analysis shows that 
Germany and the Netherlands are allocating fewer allowances to the ETS sector in 
phase 2 compared to the allocation in the first (2005-2007) period (Germany -2.8%, 
the Netherlands -11.4%). On the other hand, the UK is increasing its phase 2 cap 
by 2.6%, which may reflect the fact that actual emissions for 2005 showed a signifi-
cant shortage for the ETS installations in the UK (-33 Mio EUAs, or almost 16%) as 
well as the comfortable position the UK is in, currently having exceeded  its burden-
sharing target by 1%. However, in the light of its ambitious CO2 emission reduction 
target, the UK needs to further stimulate emissions cuts and investments in clean 
technology in the ETS sector, which covers approximately 43% of its CO2 emis-
sions. 
18 
3. ETS emissions projection 2010 (blue bar): Data for this projection were available for 
the UK and the Netherlands only, showing that both countries ETS caps are well 
below their projection of CO2 emissions of the ETS sector in 2010 (Kyoto period, 
UK -10.4% and the Netherlands -16%). Of course, this figure depends on the reli-
ability of the projection. 
4. Hypothetical Burden Sharing Target of ETS 2010: All three countries decided to 
give the ETS sector a higher-than-proportional share of the assigned amount (see 
also Figure 4 for Germany, Figure 5 for the UK and Figure 6 for the Netherlands). 
The yellow bars indicate that the Netherlands provides its ETS sector with an allo-
cation that exceeds the proportionally distributed share of ETS to all GHG emis-
sions by approximately 25% (without the use of Kyoto mechanisms), a figure that 
goes down to 18% when including the governments intention to use Kyoto credits 
in fulfilling their target (with the use of Kyoto mechanisms, red bar). Germany is 
also quite generous in setting its ETS cap for phase 2, giving the ETS sector an 
8.5% advantage over other sectors.18 Only the UKs proposed allocation has a 
close correspondence between the ETS sectors cap and its hypothetical burden-
sharing target (only 2.4% above the hypothetical ETS BS target).19 But providing 
the ETS sector with a higher-than-proportional share of a countrys Kyoto budget is 
questionable, for several reasons: First, as many studies have shown, the marginal 
abatement costs of the ETS sector are lower than abatement costs of other sectors 
of the economy, such as transport and private households.20 Thus, while the ETS 
enables the trading sector to cost-efficiently achieve its cap, the economy as a 
whole pays a premium for providing a more generous share of the Kyoto budget to 
the ETS sector rather than to those sectors where it is more costly to achieve emis-
sions reductions. Second, such an approach appears unnecessary as long as 
companies have the option to comply with their ETS obligations by partly using 
CERs and ERUs, thereby providing even lower cost mitigation options (which are 
not available to private households, for example). This is likely to hold true even 
when the ratio of ETS GHG emissions to total GHG emissions increases due to the 
                                                
18 For Germany the CO2-emission reductions required by the Draft NAP for 2010 compared to 
the base period 2000/2002 is actually significantly lower than the reductions promised in 
the voluntary agreement between the German Industry and the Government from October 
2000. These reductions would be more in line with an efficient emissions budget. 
19  If rough estimates for the emissions of additional installations to be included for the second 
phase are used, the relative difference between the caps and the hypothetical ETS bud-
gets are for Germany + 6.3 %, for the UK  0.7 % and for the Netherlands +10.7% (or +1.7 
% when including the governmental use of Kyoto mechanisms). Thus, accounting for these 
additional effects, the distance between the actual and the optimal split becomes smaller, 
in particular for the UK. However, a final judgement is difficult without verified emissions 
data for all installations included in the second phase.  
20 See for example, Böhringer et al. (2005), Criqui and Kitous (2003).or Klepper and Peterson 
(2005) 
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inclusion of additional installations. Therefore, the caps of the Netherlands and 
Germany, especially, should be reviewed in the light of minimizing the societal 
costs of fighting climate change. It is therefore worth to take a closer look at propor-
tional distribution of Member States emissions reduction targets. 
Table 1 shows the deviation of the proposed ETS cap for phase 2 from the hypothetical 
ETS burden-sharing target, assuming that the reduction burden to reach the Kyoto 
budget is distributed proportionally across sectors. The table demonstrates that there is 
still room to increase the ambition level of the ETS phase 2 caps, especially for the 
Netherlands, where a reduction of approximately 25% (or 25 Mt CO2e/a) would be 
needed to make the ETS cap correspond with the hypothetical burden-sharing target. 
Our analysis suggests that in Germany the cap would need to be cut by approximately 
8% (or 40 Mt CO2e/a) for the cap to equal the hypothetical ETS BS target.21 The UK 
cap is closest to the hypothetical ETS BS target, but also would need to be reduced by 
2% (or 6 Mt CO2e/a) before it would correspond with the hypothetical ETS BS target. 
Since emissions reductions in the ETS sector are commonly considered cheaper than 
elsewhere in the economy, these numbers are rather conservative estimates, even 
though the above-mentioned reasons for a cautious analysis still apply. However, it is 
safe to conclude that further cuts of the phase 2 ETS budgets will most likely lead to a 
decrease of the overall mitigation costs of the whole economy. 
Table 1: ETS phase 2 caps of Draft NAPs, hypothetical burden-sharing targets of trad-
ing sector and corresponding deviation of proposed 2008-2012 ETS cap 
Germany UK Netherlands
ETS Cap II (incl. NER) Mt CO2e/a 495.50 252.00 99.20
BS Target ETS Mt CO2e/a 453.51 245.92 73.85
Mt CO2e/a 41.99 6.08 25.35
% 8.5%   2.4%   25.5%   
Excess allocation compared to 
equal BS contribution by sectors  
Source:  Fraunhofer ISI, based on Draft NAPs II and UNFCCC national inventory reports 2006 
(NIR/CRF) of UK, NL and GER 
2.2 Evaluation of ETS caps compared to emission trends 
and targets from 1990 to 2010 
In the following section, we take a closer look at the GHG emissions of Germany, the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands, focusing especially on emission trends and the 
Kyoto target, as well as potential longer-term reduction targets and the corresponding 
targets for the EU ETS trading sector. Again, we used greenhouse gas data from the 
                                                
21  Due to data limitations, these numbers need to be interpreted with caution, see explanation 
in footnote above. 
20 
2006 UNFCCC national inventory reports, where the most recent year is 2004. We 
have split the total GHG emissions into five groups:   
- Energy and industry (E&I, pink striped bar): This category includes CO2 emis-
sions from energy combustion activities (excluding emissions from  transport, 
private households [see categories below], commerce and others) and industrial 
process emissions. 
- Transport (green bar): This category includes all CO2 emissions from transport 
activities, but excludes emissions from bunker fuels (e.g., aviation). 
- Private households, commerce/services and other energy-related emissions 
(Households, commerce and others, purple bar): This category includes CO2 
emissions that are commercial/institutional, residential, and of agricul-
ture/forestry/fisheries, military as well as fugitive emissions from fuels. 
- Others (blue bar): CO2 emissions in this category are those from solvents and 
other product use, waste and others.22 
- Non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions (Non CO2, yellow bar): This category sums 
up CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and SF6 emissions from all sectors, i.e. all non-CO2 
Kyoto gases. 
The data for these four categories are shown for 1990 (not necessarily the base year, 
since for some gases 1995 emissions are chosen as base year emission levels), 2000 
and 2004. Also, the graph includes the countrys Kyoto budget for 2010 and the propor-
tional distribution of this target (as of 2004) among these four categories. 
In addition, we depicted the proposed ETS cap for phase 2 for 2010 (orange bar), and 
included a line indicating the size of the hypothetical burden-sharing target for the ETS 
sector in 2010 (Kyoto period).23 Finally, for the Netherlands, the red dotted line shows 
the hypothetical burden-sharing target for the ETS sector in 2010 when including the 
governmental use of Kyoto mechanisms.24 The graphs clearly indicate  once more 
 that the German and Dutch ETS caps for 2008-2012 are very generous compared to 
the hypothetical ETS emissions target. This is especially the case in the Netherlands, 
                                                
22  There are no emissions reported in this category for Germany. 
23  This figure is just an estimate as it neither includes emissions from installations that opted-
out of the EU ETS in phase 1 nor additional ETS installations to be included in the scheme 
starting 2008. We excluded these data, as emissions are not yet verified for these addi-
tional sources. Therefore, our figures are likely to slightly underestimate the hypothetical 
ETS targets.  
24  This dotted line cannot be compared to the overall Kyoto target and the corresponding 
distribution among sectors as shown in the graph because the use of Kyoto mechanisms 
not only increases the hypothetical burden-sharing target of the ETS ,but also the overall 
target, as well as the share of all the other sectors. 
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where their proposed allocation for 2008-2012 exceeds even the E&I sectors hypo-
thetical BS target. 
Figure 4:  Germanys GHG emissions, Kyoto target, EU ETS cap of Draft NAP 2008-
2012 and hypothetical ETS burden-sharing target (no state use of Kyoto 
mechanisms)25 
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25  Germanys Draft NAP II states (on p. 43 et seq.) a different hypothetical ETS BS target 
than the one we calculate based on UNFCCC 2006 data, rather than using the German 
Energy Balances, as was done for the German NAP. 
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Figure 5:  The United Kingdoms GHG emissions, Kyoto target, EU ETS cap of Draft 
NAP 2008-2012 and hypothetical ETS burden-sharing target (no state use 
of Kyoto mechanisms)26 
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26  The UK ETS cap for phase 2 does not yet include additional installations but already cov-
ers previously opted-out installations. If the draft NAP estimate for emissions of additional 
installations were used, the hypothetical ETS burden sharing target would increase to ca. 
254 Mt CO2e/a, while the UK ETS cap is considered to be extended up to 261 Mt CO2e/a. 
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Figure 6:  The Netherlands GHG emissions, Kyoto target, EU ETS cap of Draft NAP 
2008-2012 and hypothetical ETS Burden sharing target (with and without 
use of Kyoto mechanisms [KM])27  
 
 
Source:  Fraunhofer ISI, based on NIR / CRF 2006 data for the Netherlands; UNFCCC 2006; 
Dutch NAP 2008-2012; VET 2005 for ETS in the Netherlands (CEC 2006c) 
The data shown in the graphs are also depicted in Table 2 (Germany), Table 3 (the 
UK) and Table 4 (the Netherlands). In these tables, we added fictitious GHG emission 
reduction targets for 2020 and 2050 (compared to the Kyoto base period). For 2020, 
we assumed a target of -30% (in line with recommendations by the European Council 
of -15% to -30%) and for 2050 a target of -80% (in line with recommendations of -60% 
to -80%), both relative to the Kyoto base period 1990/95. These numbers are neces-
sary in order to achieve the 2 degree target. We chose these years and reduction tar-
gets  rather than country-specific goals, such as -40% by 2020 for Germany28  to 
                                                
27  The Netherlands hypothetical ETS burden sharing target increases to approx. 89 Mt 
CO2e/a (or 97 Mt CO2e/a, with KM) when calculated with preliminary data for additional in-
stallations. 
28  For comparison, the hypothetical budget in 2020 for the German ETS sector under the 
40% reduction scenario would be about 345 M t CO2e/a. 
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make the numbers comparable across countries.29 We distributed these fictitious tar-
gets proportionally across sectors, assuming a constant share of GHG emissions with 
respect to 2004/2005. The numbers, especially those for the EU ETS in its current 
scope, impressively show that these long-term targets can only be achieved through 
fundamental reductions of GHG emissions: Germanys hypothetical ETS emissions 
target for 2010 would have to be further reduced to approximately 400 Mt CO2e by 
2020 and to around 115 Mt by 2050. The United Kingdoms hypothetical ETS emis-
sions target for 2010 would have to be reduced to 200 Mt CO2e by 2020 and to 56 Mt 
by 2050. The Netherlands hypothetical ETS emissions target for 2010 would have to 
be lowered to 55 Mt CO2e by 2020 and 15 Mt by 2050. This highlights the importance 
of setting incentives within the EU ETS so that the ETS sector will be on track and pre-
pared to meet these long-term targets. Todays caps and allocation rules, especially 
those for new entrants, need to be considered in light of trying to meet these same tar-
gets, and should reflect the deep cuts represented here. However, current NAPs do not 
support such a development, as can be seen in the analysis of the micro-plans of the 
phase 2 NAPs of Germany, the UK and the Netherlands. This is particularly trouble-
some considering that in phase 2 a significant share of capital in the power sector will 
need to be replaced, opening up a window of opportunity for a change towards low-
carbon technologies. Current draft NAPs jeopardize these opportunities. 
Table 2:  GHG emissions path and implications of potential long-term targets for Ger-
many 
1990 2000 2004 Target 2010 Potential Target 2020 Potential Target 2050
-30% -80%
E&I 651.61 530.88 544.00 520.80 461.47 131.85
Transport 162.5 182.4 171.2 163.9 145.21 41.49
Household, Commerce 
and others 216.1 172.9 170.7 163.4 144.77 41.36
Others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00
Non-CO2 196.1 136.5 129.4 123.9 109.78 31.37
Total 1,226.3 1,022.8 1,015.3 972.0 861.24 246.07
ETS Cap 495.5
Hypothetical ETS Target 453.5 401.84 114.81
Hypothetical ETS Target 
(with KM) 453.5  
Source:  Fraunhofer ISI, based on NIR / CRF 2006 for Germany; UNFCCC 2006; German NAP 
2008-2012; VET 2005 for ETS in Germany (CEC 2006c) 
                                                
29  Clearly, these analyses are hypothetical scenarios only and are not based on any kind of 
burden-sharing across EU MS to achieve a given emission reduction target at the EU level. 
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Table 3:  GHG emissions path and implications of potential long-term targets for the UK 
1990 2000 2004 Target 2010 Potential Target 2020 Potential Target 2050
-30% -80%
E&I 347.9 295.11 306.33 310.79 248.63 71.04
Transport 117.2 124.0 128.5 130.4 104.29 29.80
Households, Commerce a121.0 125.2 123.6 125.4 100.34 28.67
Others 4.1 3.6 3.8 3.8 3.05 0.87
Non-CO2 174.3 115.6 97.1 98.6 78.84 22.53
Total 764.5 663.5 659.3 668.9 535.15 152.90
ETS Cap 252.0
Hypothetical ETS Target 245.9 196.74 56.21
Hypothetical ETS Target 
(with KM) 245.9  
 
Source:  Fraunhofer ISI, based on NIR / CRF 2006 for UK; UNFCCC 2006; UK NAP 2008-2012; 
VET 2005 for ETS of UK (CEC 2006c) 
Table 4:  GHG emissions path and implications of potential long-term targets for the 
Netherlands 
1990 2000 2004 Target 2010 Potential Target 2020 Potential Target 2050
-30% -80%
E&I 93.5 97.88 104.51 96.06 71.54 20.44
Transport 26.0 32.4 34.8 32.0 23.84 6.81
Households, Commerce 
and others 39.60 39.26 41.19 37.86 28.20 8.06
Others 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.10 0.03
Non-CO2 53.6 44.9 37.1 34.1 25.41 7.26
Total all 6 GHG 213.0 214.5 217.8 200.2 149.07 42.59
ETS Cap 99.2
Hypothetical ETS Target 73.9 55.00 15.71
Hypothetical ETS Target 
(with KM) 81.3  
Source:  Fraunhofer ISI, based on NIR / CRF 2006 data for the Netherlands; UNFCCC 2006; 
Dutch NAP 2008-2012; VET 2005 for ETS in the Netherlands (CEC 2006c) 
The figures and analyses presented imply that if future emissions develop like emis-
sions of the past, emission reduction targets of 30% and 80% will not be met in the 
future.  
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3 Analysis of allocation rules at the micro level 
This section analyses the allocation rules at the micro level of the NAPs, which are 
important for innovation effects. Based primarily on arguments from economic theory, 
allocation rules are identified which help the EU ETS move MS toward reducing green-
house gas emissions at the lowest possible costs to society.  
3.1 Free allocation versus auctioning  
In principle, allowances may be allocated for free or auctioned off to participants.30 For 
the second trading period (2008-2012), the Emissions Trading Directive (CEC 2003b) 
states that  10% of allowances, at most, can be allocated through an auction; for the 
first trading period, this share was  5% of allowances. While the method of allocation 
does not  at least under ideal conditions assuming the absence of market power  
affect the market price for EUAs, participating companies are better off if allowances 
are allocated for free, since their wealth increases by the total value of these allow-
ances. Auctioning off all allowances could avoid most, if not all, problems and distribu-
tional aspects, such as early action, windfall profits or rules for new projects and clo-
sures. Distributional aspects in particular dominated the processes that led to the first 
NAPs in most EU MS, and are the source of several counterproductive rules in the EU 
ETS.31 Thus, if all allowances were auctioned off, the NAPs would be much simpler, 
more transparent and more effective. In addition, the outcome of an auction may be 
perceived as fair because - in contrast to a free allocation of allowances  the pol-
luter-pays principle holds.  
Auctioning off allowances would also address windfall profits. Just as companies try 
to pass on any additional marginal costs (opportunity costs) associated with emissions 
(i.e., price of allowances) to customers, extra profits (windfall profits) accrue if allow-
ances are allocated for free. Opportunity cost pricing is not only sensible from an eco-
nomic perspective, it is also essential for an ETS to send the correct price signals in 
order to provide adequate incentives to save emissions and to minimize total reduction 
costs.32 In principle, whether allowances are auctioned off or allocated for free does 
not alter the opportunity costs (of additional emissions), but leads to very different out-
comes in terms of the distribution of the scarcity rents associated with the allowances. 
The power sector managed to pass on a large part of the opportunity costs to its cus-
                                                
30 Allowances may also be sold at a fixed price; however, participation would have to be ra-
tioned according to some rule as long as this fixed price remains below the (expected) 
market price.  
31 These problems include, among others, early action, rules for new entrants and ex-post 
adjustments (e.g., in Germany in NAP 1). 
32  From this perspective any attempts to directly regulate the price for EUAs, for example by 
setting a cap, would be counterproductive. 
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tomers, in particular because demand for electricity is fairly inelastic (at least in the 
short run).33 As a consequence, the power sector secured high windfall profits. Esti-
mates of the pass-through rates are generally high. These rates vary between 60 and 
80%, depending on the country, market structure, demand elasticity and CO2 price 
considered (Sijm et al. 2006). Windfall profits would disappear if allowances were auc-
tioned off, and auction revenues could then be used for other purposes. Thus, in the 
long run, the EU ETS should strive for an auction share of 100%. To phase in a fully 
auctioned system, the auction share for the second trading period could be set to the 
maximum allowed by the Emissions Trading Directive (CEC 2003b), that is to 10% of 
the emissions trading budget. Auctioning off a small part of the budget right at the be-
ginning of the trading period may also generate robust early price signals for the actual 
scarcity in the market, since participants base their bidding behaviour on their marginal 
abatement costs. Hence, the auction would generate an early price indicator, which 
may help participants develop their investment and trading strategies and may improve 
the efficiency of the system (see also Ehrhart et al. 2005).  
Concluding summary of main points: 
 In the long run all allowances should be auctioned off.  
 For the trading period of 2008-2012, Member States should set share of allowances 
to be auctioned off at the maximum level allowed by the Directive, that is at 10% of 
the total budget.  
 Auctioning allowances would reduce windfall profits. 
 Auctioning and free allocation are expected to have identical effects on output 
prices. 
3.2 Benchmarks versus grandfathering for existing instal-
lations 
As long as full auctioning is not feasible, other allocation rules have to be used. The 
most common approach is to allocate allowances to existing installations according to 
their historical emissions in a fairly recent reference period (conventional grandfather-
ing).34 However, conventional grandfathering may lead to undesirable distributional 
effects, since companies investing in abatement measures prior to this period (early 
action) receive fewer allowances than those who did not invest in such measures. The 
                                                
33 From a theoretical perspective, market power may result in higher or lower increases in the 
product price in response to the introduction of the EU ETS compared to perfect competi-
tion. The outcome depends on, among other things, the shape of the demand curve.   
34 For the first trading period (2005-2007) most EU Member States used grandfathering (for 
overviews see Betz et al. [2004], Ecofys [2004], Matthes et al. [2005] or DEHSt 2005]). 
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latter companies are then able to reduce emissions at lower costs and sell the surplus 
allowances on the market. This problem will arise in future trading periods if base peri-
ods are updated to calculate allocation at the installation-level.  
Alternatively, allocation could be made based on benchmarks, i.e., on specific emission 
values per unit of production (e.g., kg CO2/MWh electricity or t CO2/t cement clinker) for 
a particular group of products or installations. For distributional reasons, benchmarks 
based on average specific emission values per unit of production (average bench-
marks) may be politically more feasible for existing installations.35 The actual number 
of allowances can be derived from the specific benchmark value per unit of activity mul-
tiplied by the past or predicted activity rates of the individual installations. In general, a 
benchmarking allocation favours carbon-efficient installations compared to less carbon-
efficient installations, since operators in the latter category need to purchase missing 
allowances on the market or have fewer excess allowances. To limit the distributional 
effects, the benchmarks used for existing installations could be differentiated according 
to fuel use, technologies, installation size or application (e.g., load). While such differ-
entiated benchmarks are likely to result in efficiency losses and higher overall mitiga-
tion costs, these losses would be smaller for existing installations (compared with new 
installations).  
In the EU ETS, benchmarking could also provide additional incentives for moderniza-
tion (compared with conventional grandfathering).36 For installations receiving fewer 
free allowances under benchmarking than under conventional grandfathering, bench-
marking provides a higher incentive for substitution of inefficient installations if closures 
of installations lead to a termination of allocation (see also Cremer and Schleich 2006). 
The tighter the benchmark, the higher this incentive would be. Finally, benchmarking 
would facilitate comparison across EU MS, a possible first step towards harmonized 
allocation rules throughout the EU (Kruger and Pizer 2004). In fact, EU-wide bench-
marks  possibly developed in coordination with business associations  could also 
be used to determine the allowance budget at the level of sectors. Such a procedure 
would contribute to levelling the playing field for allocation. 
The potential drawbacks of benchmarking include more stringent data requirements 
and the need to build benchmark groups (see Radov et al. 2005). Distributional effects, 
which may be high even if differentiated benchmarks are used, may render bench-
marks politically infeasible.37 In the guidelines for the second trading period, the Com-
mission stated that EU-wide benchmarking is not a sufficiently matured allocation 
                                                
35 Benchmarks based on the specific CO2 emissions of the best available technology (BAT-
benchmarks) would be more appropriate for new entrants. 
36  Incentives to reduce emissions are the same under a benchmarking allocation and conven-
tional grandfathering. 
37 See Cremer and Schleich (2006) for an empirical analysis of the distributional effects of 
different benchmarking rules for the German power sector. 
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method to be used for the second phase. Member States may however find appropri-
ate use for benchmarking at the national level for the installation level allocation in cer-
tain sectors and for new entrants, e.g. in the electricity sector. (CEC 2005b, p. 8). The 
power sector, which is responsible for the vast majority of emissions in the EU ETS, 
seems particularly well suited to benchmarking, since its output is fairly homogenous 
and it is easy to assign installations to benchmarking groups. 
Concluding summary of main points: 
 To address early action and provide incentives for replacement of inefficient tech-
nologies, gratis allocation for existing installations should be based on product-
specific benchmarks for sufficiently homogenous product groups. 
 Undifferentiated benchmarks would provide the highest incentives for the replace-
ment of inefficient technologies.  
3.3 Allocation rules for new projects 
Neither the Emissions Trading Directive nor the NAP guidelines make any recommen-
dations about how new projects (i.e., new installations and capacity extensions of exist-
ing installations) should be treated.38 In principle, three methods are acceptable under 
the Directive: auctioning, a purchase of EUAs on the market or free allocation (from the 
reserve for new entrants). However, the logic of emissions trading requires that all al-
lowances for new projects be purchased at market prices, ensuring that investment 
decisions are based on the full social costs (i.e., private costs plus environmental cost). 
Allocating free allowances to new projects amounts to subsidizing investments (and 
output)39, increasing  ceteris paribus  the costs of achieving climate targets.  
If newcomers have to buy allowances on the market or through an auction, there are 
strong monetary incentives to implement energy-efficient technologies that require the 
purchase of fewer allowances. In contrast, if new projects receive free allowances, the 
incentives to use the most cost-efficient technologies are weaker and depend on the 
actual allocation rules.40 As a second-best solution, the allocation for new projects 
could be based on uniform Best Available Technology benchmarks and standardized 
projections of production or utilization rates for homogenous products. In this case, 
                                                
38 Even though the Commission would have preferred newcomers to buy allowances on the 
market, e.g. European Commission DG Environment (CEC 2003a). 
39  See Graichen and Requate (2005), Spulber (1985) or the Council of Environmental Advi-
sors to the German Government (SRU 2006). 
40  In the first trading period (2008-2012), all MS established a New Entrant Reserve (NER) to 
allocate allowances to new projects for free, often on a first-come-first-served basis. Excep-
tions are non-CHP plants in the Swedish power sector, which have to buy all their allow-
ances on the market.  
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there are strong innovation incentives to invest in the most efficient technology within a 
given product group, independent of the level of the benchmark. Investments in tech-
nologies that produce fewer specific emissions than the benchmark generate extra 
allowances, which may be sold on the market. By contrast, technologies that are less 
efficient than the benchmark create additional costs for the purchase of allowances. 
Any further differentiation (e.g., by fuels, processes or by utilization rates) implies addi-
tional subsidization of particular installations and further reduces the cost-saving poten-
tial of the EU ETS.41 In particular, the more sub-benchmarks there are within a product 
group or within a technology group, the smaller the innovation effects, since innovation 
incentives are limited to the sub-groups.  
Concluding summary of main points: 
 Allocating allowances for free to new projects amounts to subsidizing output and 
increases the overall societal costs of achieving emission targets.  
 New projects should acquire needed allowances at market prices. 
 If new projects receive allowances for free, allocation should be based on BAT-
benchmarks and standardized load factors.  
 Differentiating benchmarks or load factors (e.g. by technologies or fuels) results in 
distorted incentives for innovation, subsidies for particular technologies or fuels and 
eventually higher overall reduction costs for society.  
 Undifferentiated benchmarks would provide the highest incentives for the replace-
ment of inefficient technologies.  
3.4 Allocation rules for closures 
The Emissions Trading Directive requires that allowances can only be allocated to in-
stallations that operate under a permit to emit greenhouse gases (Article 11 in combi-
nation with Article 4, CEC 2004b). Thus, if closed installations cease to adhere to the 
permit or do not have a permit at all, the issue of allowances stops. However, taking 
away allowances for closures results in (economic) inefficiencies and disincentives for 
new investments. If closure leads to a cessation of an installations allocation, old 
plants may continue to operate for too long and new investments may be postponed, 
because the opportunity costs of a closure are not accounted for properly. In fact, eco-
nomic theory suggests that stopping allocation for closures subsidizes output, since 
there will be too many companies in the market (Graichen and Requate 2005, Spulber 
                                                
41  For the first trading period in most MS, allocation for new projects is typically based on 
BAT-values or BAT-benchmarks for homogenous products (or technologies). Benchmarks 
for product groups are used, in particular, in the energy sector, but usually differentiated by 
technologies and/or fuels (see Schleich and Betz 2005, or DEHSt 2005 for an overview).  
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1985).42 In the first trading period, most MS decided that once an installation has been 
closed there should be no further issuance of allowances for the remainder of the pe-
riod. To provide additional incentives for new investments, some MS, like the UK, the 
Netherlands and Germany, permit the transfer of allocated allowances from closed 
installations to new ones. 
Concluding summary of main points: 
 From the perspective of economic efficiency, installation closures should not result 
in termination of allocation.  
 Transfer rules may provide additional incentives for new investments. 
 
3.5 Treatment of clean technologies 
Since the EU ETS focuses on combustion installations, renewable energy technologies 
like wind power, hydro and photovoltaic installations are not directly covered by the EU 
ETS. Therefore, no direct innovation effects can be expected for these technologies. At 
best, renewable energy technologies may benefit indirectly, if the EU ETS results in a 
sufficient increase in the costs of conventional power (and heat generation), making 
renewable energies (RES) more competitive. However, a substantial increase in elec-
tricity prices is required in order to drive incentives for renewable energy technologies 
(Wuppertal Institut für Klima, Umwelt und Energie 2006). The only renewable technolo-
gies that may be directly supported by the NAPs are biomass- or waste-based combus-
tion installations, if their rated thermal input exceeds 20 MW. However, some countries, 
like Germany, have excluded such installations from the EU-ETS. If these installations 
were included and received allowances (e.g., via benchmarking) they may benefit 
twice: From the EU ETS and from specific support systems like feed-in-tariffs. Other-
wise, they will have to bear transaction costs to comply with the provisions set by the 
Emissions Trading Directive and subsequent regulations at EU or national levels. Other 
countries, like the UK, have included such installations and set incentives for the use of 
clean fuels, e.g., the use of a uniform benchmark for new entrants based on gas. Thus, 
investors in biomass or waste material will be able to sell their surplus allocation. In 
sum, the EU ETS is not expected to particularly enhance the diffusion of RES-
technologies and therefore other, more direct national support mechanisms, such as 
                                                
42  For example, the U.S. EPA Acid Rain program for SO2 and NOx from power plants is gov-
erned by more efficient allocation rules for closures, and also for new entrants: Closure of a 
plant will not terminate allocation, and new projects need to purchase allowances on the 
market or via auctions. Linking allocation to operators, as is practised in this program, 
would facilitate more efficient rules for closures and new entrants in the EU ETS. 
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feed-in tariffs, (tradable) quota systems or direct R&D subsidies, need to remain in 
place.  
The EU ETS does not directly favour a particular technology, such as combined heat 
and power. Instead, the price and cost incentives favour a variety of energy/carbon-
saving technologies. However, allocation rules for newcomers could be used to support 
particular technologies. In fact, based on allocation criterion 9, some countries decided 
to include special provisions for clean technologies, such as new combined heat and 
power (CHP). Because fuel is used more efficiently, CHP plants exhibit lower emis-
sions compared to situations where both heat and electricity are generated in separate 
installations.  
Concluding summary of main points: 
 Benchmarking allocation would directly favour renewable energy technologies that 
are covered by the Directive (i.e., biomass- and waste-based installations). Conven-
tional grandfathering would leave those installations with transaction costs only, but 
no direct benefits. 
 Renewable energy installations benefit indirectly from the EU ETS because genera-
tion costs of fossil fuel-based technologies increase.  
 To accelerate the diffusion of renewable technologies or CHP, other, more direct 
support mechanisms might be necessary 
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4 Conclusions 
This section presents conclusions the Netherlands based on analyses at the macro 
and micro levels of the Draft NAPs of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, as well as 
on the results of verified emissions data for installations from 2005. It identifies areas 
where the NAPs could more ambitiously meet the long-term climate targets and design 
allocation rules that would allow the EU ETS to achieve those emission targets at low 
costs to society.  
4.1 Macro level 
Short term 
With respect to the short-term (2008-2012) emission targets, data from the latest Na-
tional Inventory Reports for 2006 together with the Draft NAPs suggest that:  
• In Germany, greenhouse gas emissions were significantly reduced between 
1990 and 1998  partially thanks to wall-fall profits i.e., the reconstruction and 
modernization of the energy and industry systems in former East Germany43. 
Since then, however, emissions have been increasing in the power sector, and 
stagnating overall. Germany appears to be prepared to meet its burden-sharing 
target on its own, but additional efforts are now required to close the remaining 
gap of 3.5%.  
• The UK realized significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, also 
thanks to special circumstances in the early 1990s, when the liberalization of 
the energy markets led to a "dash for gas" in the power sector. Since then, total 
emissions in the UK have been relatively stable. The UK is clearly on track to 
meet its burden-sharing target on its own. 
• In the Netherlands, current CO2 emission levels are even higher than in 1990, 
and the burden-sharing target will only be met through significant reductions of 
non-CO2 emissions and by relying heavily on the use of the Flexible Mecha-
nisms of the Kyoto Protocol: 50% of the reductions needed to achieve the bur-
den-sharing target have to be financed by the federal budget for purchasing 
                                                
43 See Schleich et al. (2001) for a quantitative analysis of the wall-fall profits. 
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credits from JI and CDM-projects. If prices for these CERs and ERUs continue 
to increase, this budget will have to be adjusted upward.44  
 
Mid- and long-term 
With respect to the mid-term and long-term emission reduction targets of 30% and 
80%, respectively, our extrapolation analyses imply:  
• For emission reductions of -30% by 2020 and -80% by 2050, Germanys hypo-
thetical ETS emissions target would need to be approximately 400 Mt CO2e by 
2020 and around 115 Mt CO2e by 2050; the required ETS-emission target of 
the UK would be around 200 Mt CO2e in 2020 and 55 Mt in 2050; and the 
Netherlands hypothetical ETS emissions target for 2020 would be roughly 55 
Mt CO2e by 2020 and some 15 Mt CO2e by 2050.45 
• If emissions continue to develop as they have over the last five years, Ger-
many, the UK and the Netherlands will be far from achieving the mid-term and 
long-term indicative reduction targets. 
• The emission targets implied at the macro level suggest that Germany, the UK 
and the Netherlands did not use the NAPs to lead their economies on a reduc-
tion path towards these mid-term or long-term targets. To get there, they will 
have to be significantly more ambitious.  
• More stringent allocation plans for the second phase would result in higher fu-
ture prices for EUAs, which would mean additional financial incentives to invest 
in carbon-efficient technologies early on. If reduction efforts are postponed for 
too long and sudden emission reductions become unavoidable for ecological 
reasons, total (i.e., inter-temporal) reduction costs for society may be much 
higher (due to that fact that sudden changes to the economy and its technologi-
cal infrastructure are associated with higher costs, when compared to a 
smoother transition). 
                                                
44 In the National Budget 2006 it is stated that for the period 1998 to 2011  340 mio is re-
served for JI credits, and  402 mio for CDM credits.  So, in order to purchase the neces-
sary credits for around 100 Mton CO2, this budget implies a specific average price of  
7/ton CO2.  
(see:http://rijksbegroting.minfin.nl/default.asp?CMS_ITEM=6B621CAE8AFA4F3F93AD1A074A
965065X727X50991X61). The Dutch government announced in April 2006 that due to 
market price increases and delay in project delivery  tens of mios more will be reserved to 
ensure the purchases. 
45  These figures are based on the current scope of the EU ETS, but as it is going to be ex-
tended (including both additional installations as well as currently opted out installations), 
the numbers  once verified data becomes available  will need to be adjusted, thereby 
slightly increasing the hypothetical targets for the ET-sector. 
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• By reducing investment uncertainty, policy makers can accelerate the structural 
change in energy and industry technologies and infrastructures necessary to 
meet long-term climate targets. They should set credible long-term emission 
targets and implement policies that will allow these targets to be met.  
 
Ambition level of Draft NAPs 
Analyses of the ambition levels of the ET-budget for Draft NAPs for 2008-2012 show 
that:  
• Germany and the Netherlands decrease the ET-budget for the second phase 
compared to the first phase, but the implied reduction for Germany is rather 
small.  
• The UK and the Netherlands decrease the ET-budget compared to projected 
emissions of the ET-installations; if the projected growth rates turn out to be 
correct, the implied reduction is about 10% for the UK and approximately 16% 
for the Netherlands.  
• The Netherlands intends to apply a compliance factor of 0.86, implying that the 
second NAP looks more stringent than the first NAP, which used 0.97 as its 
compliance factor. The flexibility to choose the best out of five reference years 
(2001-2005) may have led to inflated reference emission levels.46 
• Germany, which did not provide projections for emissions and ended with a 
rather large surplus allocation in 2005, highlights the importance of using emis-
sion projections to determine the size of the ET-budget. Thus, Germany should 
also provide emission projections for NAP 2. 
 
ETS versus non-ETS sectors 
Our analyses of the size of the emission budgets for the ETS-sectors and the non-ETS-
sectors suggest that:  
• In all three MS, the budgets for the ET-sectors are too high, in particular in 
Germany. Thus, compared to the optimal split, the current budgets benefit 
companies with ET-installations at the expense of the other sectors (private 
households, transport), and overall reduction costs for society are too high.  
• To lower societal costs in the second phase, the ET-sector should receive a 
relatively smaller share of the budgets compared to the first phase. 
 
                                                
46    CO2 Emissiehandel Nieuwsbrief, June 19th, 2006. 
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Verified Emissions in 2005 
The verified emissions data for 2005 were a first check on the ambition of the NAPs for 
the first trading period, and of the potential for a more ambitious allocation in the sec-
ond phase. General results and additional analyses for the three Member States lead 
to the following findings: 
• The surplus of 44 Mio. EUAs in 2005 suggests that, on average, allocation was 
fairly generous in the MS. Unless there is major economic growth, it seems 
quite likely that a surplus of allowances will also emerge in 2006 and 2007. In 
this case, the price for EUAs would be expected to drop further, since banking 
into the next phase is not allowed,47 and the EU ETS would then provide few 
incentives for energy efficiency or innovation, defeating its very purpose. 
• Of the countries analyzed in this report, the VET data imply that only the UK 
had a stringent allocation, while the surplus was largest in Germany in absolute 
terms (21 Mio. EUAs) and in the Netherlands in relative terms (about 7% com-
pared to verified emissions). The results for Germany and the Netherlands sug-
gest that a larger reduction than required by the ETS budget for the first trading 
period would have been feasible.48 The Netherlands knew this in advance, but 
granted credit for early action, which was achieved under the benchmark and 
energy efficiency covenants. 
• In the UK and the Netherlands, energy-installations were generally short (rely-
ing more on coal than anticipated because of high gas prices in 2005); this was 
not the case in Germany, however, where identical compliance factors are in 
place for energy and non-energy installations. Installations from all other sec-
tors were long in all three countries. Since Germany also plans to apply a 
stricter compliance factor for energy installations in the second phase, energy 
installations may be short in all three MS. Empirical evidence suggests that in 
the Netherlands, gas-fired CHP is being used less often. Likewise, one large re-
finery had a major shut-down. 
• In the Netherlands, there is some indication that projected growth in certain sec-
tors (in particular in the iron and steel sectors, but also in manufacturing) was 
high compared to actual economic development, which resulted in a high sur-
plus of EUAs. In the next phase, growth projections may have to be checked 
even more carefully; the application of a national growth figure of 1.7% may be 
useful, but not necessarily conservative enough. In any case, ambitiousness of 
the budget will be determined by the compliance factor.  
                                                
47  See Schleich et al. (2006) for an assessment of the banking provisions in the EU ETS.  
48  This sharp decline in emissions in the ETS installations comes as a surprise, in the light of 
the slight upward trend in the energy and industry sectors in Germany in recent years. 
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• For the Netherlands, allocation in the first phase had regressive effects: Smaller 
installations received a relatively lower surplus/higher deficit than larger installa-
tions. Upon additional analysis of the underlying reasons, this may have to be 
addressed in the second phase. 
• In Germany, about half of the surplus came from installations where allocation 
is based on the options rule (emission value multiplied by expected output). It is 
therefore particularly important not to introduce a similar allocation rule into the 
second NAP at the final minutes, as was the case for the first NAP.  
4.2 Micro level 
The trading of emissions by itself does not reduce emissions. But, if designed properly, 
the EU ETS can contribute to achieving emission reduction targets at low costs. Based 
on the arguments derived from economic theory and from empirical evidence, we con-
clude the following:  
Auctioning  
• In all Member States the auction share should be set at the maximum possible 
level of 10%. While Germany does not intend to introduce an auction, the UK 
and the Netherlands intend to do so in the second phase. For the UK, the auc-
tion share should be set at the maximum level of the given range of 2%-10%. 
The Netherlands plans to auction a share of 4 %, which corresponds to 10% of 
the allocation of the power sector.49 The auction share for the power sector (or 
sectors which manage to pass on a large share of the additional costs) could 
be raised to 10% of the overall allocation.  
• Since the power sector proved particularly able to pass on the additional costs 
of the EU ETS, the auction share should be taken primarily from the intended 
budget of the power producers to address windfall profits. In the Netherlands, 
this will specifically be the case.  
Windfall profits and competition  
• In the political debate in all countries, the question of how to best address 
windfall profits got mixed up with the issue of competition. While windfall profits 
may be the consequence of the free allocation of allowances, higher output 
prices (e.g., electricity prices) are the consequence of the EU ETS putting a 
price tag on carbon. Windfall profits are an issue that should be dealt with in 
the NAPs, e.g., through tighter allocation for those companies benefiting from 
free allocation. Higher output prices are is an intended effect of the EU ETS 
and should be independent of the allocation method. The EU ETS changes the 
                                                
49 Thus, the overall cut of 4% represents 2/3 of the 15% budget cut for the power sector as a 
measure to address windfall profits.  
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relative prices of factors of production, and thus necessarily affects competi-
tion: Carbon-intensive production should become relatively more expensive. 
The effect on output prices, however, should be the same whether allowances 
are allocated for free or auctioned off. Since the source of windfall profits rests 
in the method of allocation, the issue of windfall profits should be addressed in 
the NAPs. By contrast, the issue of competition is not affected by the allocation 
method of allowances.50,51 
• Competition may be distorted if electricity-intensive industries, like the alumi-
num industry, compete internationally with companies from countries where 
there is no climate policy in place. Production may then shift to those countries 
and total emissions may actually increase if production processes abroad are 
more carbon-intensive (leakage effects). Most existing studies, however, indi-
cate that the distortionary effects of emissions trading are lower than for other 
instruments.52 
• To reduce windfall profits in the power sector, Germany changed its allocation 
philosophy (compared to the NAP for 2005-2007) and now requires a higher 
reduction of 0.85 from energy installations, compared to 0.9875 for other instal-
lations. But even with a cut of 15%, windfall profits are likely to be quite sub-
stantial and could be honed still further, via auctioning, for example. 
• Since windfall profits are also subject to corporate (and other) taxes, not all ad-
ditional revenues translate into an equal increase in net profits for companies. 
Thus, at least to some extent, taxation may effectively reduce windfall profits. 
The relative effectiveness of both taxation and auctions also depends on na-
tional tax laws.  
Using benchmarks for existing installations 
• If auctioning is not feasible, benchmarks should be used for allocation to exist-
ing installations for sufficiently homogenous products (like electricity). In particu-
lar, benchmarks account for early action and may provide higher incentives for 
modernization. These incentives would be higher for uniform benchmarks than 
for differentiated benchmarks (e.g., by fuels or technologies). They would also 
be higher for BAT-benchmarks than for average benchmarks.53 
                                                
50 Of course, the impact on competition depends on the price of the EUAs, which in turn is a 
function of the total emission budgets in all EU MS.  
51  For example, the SRU (2006) argues that competitiveness arguments have been errone-
ously used in the political debate, when in fact the issue at stake is distribution. 
52  For a recent overview, see Oberndorfer et al. (2006). 
53  Unless a fixed budget exists for a benchmark-group of installations. 
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• The Netherlands Allocation in the German power sector in phase 2 should be 
based on benchmarks, as in the UK and the Netherlands, 
• Differentiated benchmarks distort incentives for innovation. However, because 
of sunk costs, applying differentiated benchmarks to existing installations would 
be less harmful than for new installations. Differentiated benchmarks limit distri-
butional effects and should gather higher political support than uniform bench-
marks.  
 
Allocation to new projects 
• Allocation rules for new installations and modernizations are crucial from a long-
term perspective since they (together with several other factors) determine in-
vestment decisions and thus affect the technology structure and CO2-intensity 
of the capital stock many years in advance. 
• Allocating allowances to new projects for free  as planned in the Draft NAPs 
for Germany, the UK and the Netherlands  amounts to subsidizing invest-
ments and output, and increases the costs of achieving climate targets. Thus, 
new projects should buy needed allowances at market prices. 
• Since allocation to new entrants is perceived by the national governments as a 
means to attract new investments, the optimal allocation rule for new entrants is 
unlikely to emerge without coordination among EU MS.  
• The German and Dutch Draft NAPs plan for reserve replenishment mecha-
nisms if new projects receive free allowances from a new entrants reserve. If 
future reduction costs are lower than current costs, such a mechanism will ac-
tually reduce total emissions over time. However, the opposite may also be 
true. The main critique, though, is that these mechanisms shift the burden of 
reducing emissions into the future, which is at odds with the concept of inter-
generational equity.  
• As a second-best solution, allocation for new entrants should be based on uni-
form BAT-benchmarks. Differentiating benchmarks (e.g., by fuels) distorts dy-
namic innovation incentives and also leads to higher societal reduction costs in 
the long run. Differentiated benchmarks are, in essence, technology- or fuel-
specific subsidies and counter the spirit of emissions trading systems. In the EU 
ETS, flexibility and EUA market prices should guide investment decisions, 
rather than subsidies for particular types of installations. 
• Rather than having two benchmarks for new energy technologies  one for gas 
and one for other installations  the final German NAP should rely on one 
benchmark only. For distributional reasons (and to save the new entrants re-
serve and future budgets), this benchmark should be based on BAT for gas-
fired combined-cycle gas turbines, as is the case in the UK. 
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• Like the use of weak benchmarks, the use of high standardized operating 
hours/load factors to calculate the number of free allowances for new projects 
corresponds to high subsidies, and possibly high windfall profits for new pro-
jects. Standardized load factors should be low to prevent depletion of the NER. 
The reserve would also benefit from low load factors because they make the 
(optional) use of the transfer rule more attractive.  
• The standardized load factors proposed in the German Draft NAP, which tend 
to be in the range of actual historic load factors, should be adjusted downward. 
For power plants, which are expected to be responsible for the bulk of allow-
ances for new projects from the NER, it is crucial that the standardized annual 
operating hours be kept at a much lower level than 7000 hours p.a.54  
• To avoid unjustified, technology-specific subsidies, standardized load factors 
should be equal for all fuels or technologies (within a homogenous group of 
products), as is the case in the UK. 
• Allocation rules for new projects in Germany, but not in the UK or the Nether-
lands, apply for several phases (now 14 years). This increases investment se-
curity, but is also likely to secure windfall profits for an equally long period of 
time. Allocation rules that extend well into the future also limit the flexibility of fu-
ture NAPs and corresponding budgets.  
• Transfer rules may speed up the establishment of new installations, since they 
should generate additional financial incentives for an earlier replacement of old 
installations. In the Draft NAP for phase 2, the Netherlands decided to introduce 
such a transfer rule, similar to the one already in place in Germany in phase 1. 
The transfer rule of phase 1 in the UK NAP is also proposed to be kept for 
phase 2. However, it is more restricted than the German transfer rule, since the 
closing and receiving installation need to have the same permit holder and need 
to fall in the same EU ETS sector. 
 
Treatment of clean technologies 
• To support investments in new CHP installations, Germany, the UK and the 
Netherlands use allocation rules to subsidize new CHP. In the UK, there is a 
special proportion of the New Entrant Reserve (10%) ring-fenced for good qual-
ity (GQ) CHP in order to ensure that the projected growth in CHP is accurately 
                                                
54  Unlike other installations, there is no proposal for standardized operating hours for power 
plants included in the German Draft NAP. 
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and transparently recognised.55 In addition, it is proposed that GQ CHP will re-
ceive 100% allocation based on the calculations for new entrants, compared to 
other electricity supply industries, which will receive a maximum of 90% of the 
calculated allocation. In Germany and in the Netherlands, new CHP plants 
benefit from an allocation based on a double benchmark for heat and electric-
ity. From an economic perspective these special treatments correspond to an 
investment subsidy for particular CHP plants, but should not affect competitive-
ness of these plants per se. Instead, if additional support for CHP is considered 
necessary under current economic conditions, other types of support mecha-
nisms, like feed-in tariffs or quotas, should be used. 
• Because of transaction costs and to avoid double regulation, renewable energy 
technologies should be excluded from EU ETS. Renewable energy technolo-
gies benefit indirectly, since the EU ETS increases the generation costs for fos-
sil-fuelled technologies.  
Concluding remarks 
• The analyses and arguments developed in this report suggest that  although 
some improvement in the NAPs is noticeable  there are still many allocation 
rules in the Draft NAPs for Germany, the Netherlands and the UK which reflect 
attempts made to use the EU ETS for distributional effects and to preserve ex-
isting energy structures. These rules often result in negative effects, such as in-
creased costs of climate protection, shifting the burden of emissions reduction 
to operators of installations not benefiting from special provisions, or a transfer 
of wealth and windfall profits.56  
• With respect to the aims of this project, the analyses carried out and the argu-
ments presented show that there is still ample room to increase the ambition 
level of the Draft NAPs of Germany, the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent, the 
UK. This holds true for both the macro level, i.e., the overall budget, as well as 
for the micro level, that is, the design of the rules governing the allocation of al-
lowances.  
+ + + 
                                                
55  Good quality CHP means that the power efficiency is greater than or equal to 20% and the 
Quality Index (which combines power and heat efficiencies adjusted by factors that take 
size, technology and fuel of the individual scheme into account) is greater than or equal to 
100.  
56  See also the assessment of allocation rules for the first trading period by the Council of 
Environmental Advisors to the German Government (SRU 2006). 
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Annex A: Summary of National Allocation Plans for  
Germany, the United Kingdom and the Nether-
lands 
 
GERMANY 
NAP 2005-2007 
Micro-level plan (allocation rules) 
Installations covered  
(share of CO2 emissions) 
1849 (59%), no opt-in, no opt-out, (no pooling).  
Allocation share of energy sector in terms of installations (emissions): 
66.7% (78.8%).  
Allocation method 
for 
existing installations 
100 % cost-free allocation, with the following options: 
Based on annual average emissions in base period 2000-2002; uniform 
compliance factor of 0.9702 and uniform adjustment factor of 0.9538,  
use of new entrant rule and uniform adjustment factor (option rule). 
Note: Allocation method does not discriminate between sectors. 
Allocation method  
for 
new entrants 
100% cost-free allocation based on best-available technology bench-
marks and projected output;57 for electricity and heat generation, upper 
and lower bounds exist (e.g., 365g CO2/kwh and 750g CO2/kwh for elec-
tricity); investors may apply for higher specific values than the given 
lower bound if they can prove that the new technology is BAT; fixed 
product- or technology-specific benchmarks for the production of ho-
mogenous products (cement clinker, glass and bricks); BAT standards 
for inhomogeneous products on the basis of a submission-of-proof pro-
cedure; no compliance factor will be applied to these allocation rules for 
14 years.  
Transfer rule: Allowances from closed installations may be transferred to 
replacement installation for four years (afterwards no compliance factor 
will be imposed for 14 years). 
Special provisions for 
energy efficient-
installations 
For existing combined heat and power (CHP) installations, additional 
allowances of 27 t per kWh CHP electricity generation.58  
Double benchmark (heat/electricity) for new CHP plants. 
Treatment of renewable 
energy sources (RES) 
Installations covered by Renewable Energy Act (benefit from feed in 
tariffs for RES) are excluded from EU ETS. 
                                                
57 Subject to ex-post adjustment; decision by European Court of Justice is pending. 
58 Subject to ex-post adjustment; decision by European Court of Justice is pending. 
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Special features Early action rules: Installations which exceed threshold levels for specific 
emission reductions receive allocation with compliance factor of 1.0 for 
12 years after modernization (going back to 1994); if specific reduction 
exceeds 40%, compliance factor will be 1.0 for the first two trading peri-
ods. 
For process-related emissions, compliance factor of 1.0 is applied if 
share of process-related emissions on total emissions exceeds 10% 
(adjustment factor is not applied). 
Capacity utilisation adjustment rule: If in one year a drop in production 
leads to emission levels which are below 60% of emission levels in the 
base period, allocation will be adjusted in proportion (ex-post adjust-
ment). 
Hardship clause(s): Special provisions may apply, if emissions in base 
period are at least 25% below regular levels. 
Additional allowances as compensation for phase-out of nuclear power. 
Reserve replenishment rule: Size of reserve is 3 Mt p.a. (i.e., 0.6% of 
budget); if needed, additional allowances will be purchased by the Ger-
man Reconstruction Bank (KfW) and distributed free of charge; the pur-
chased quantity of allowances will be subtracted from the budget in 
2008-2012 and sold on the market (refinancing of KfW). 
Allocation rules, in particular new entrant rules, are in part defined over 
long periods; complex system, 58 combinations of rules were used. 
Note: New data from revised NIR for Germany (2006) resulted in adjustment of base year emis-
sions and target emission levels; application of ex-post adjustments are subject to final outcome 
of lawsuit at EU Court of Justice on EU Commission decisions regarding German NAP. 
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GERMANY 
NAP 2008-2012 (Draft Version of 13 April 2006) 
Macro-level plan (emission targets and budgets) 
CO2,1990(Mt CO2e/a) (Hypothetical) CO2 BS target 
excluding Kyoto mechanisms 
(Mt CO2e/a) 
GHG1990/199
5 (Mt 
CO2e/a) 
ETS59 Non-ETS 
BS target 
(Mt 
CO2e/a) 
BS 
(%) 
ETS60 Non-ETS 
378.1 651.1 453.5 394.6 
Burden sharing 
target (BS) & ETS 
1230.3 
1029.1 
972.961 -21 
848.1 
CO2,2004(Mt CO2e/a) DTT2004 Mt CO2e/a GHG2004 62 
(Mt 
CO2e/a)  ETS Non-ETS 
KM 2008-12  
(Mt CO2e/a) 
without KM with KM 
540 341.1 
Emissions, dis-
tance to target 
(DTT), use of 
Kyoto mecha-
nisms (KM) by 
government 
1008 
882.063 
0 43.3 43.3 
2005-07 2008-12 
R2005-07 R2008-12 ETS2005-07 cap includ-
ing R2005-07 (Mt 
CO2e/a) Mt CO2e/a % 
ETS2008-12 cap in-
cluding R2008-12 (Mt 
CO2e/a) Mt CO2e/a % 
ETS cap (both 
NAP I and II) & 
new entrant re-
serve (R)  
499 3 0.6 495.5 12 (10)64 2.4
(2) 
Difference to allocation for 
2005 
Verified emis-
sions (VET) of 
ETS-installations 
VET2005 Mt CO2  
(% of installations covered) 
Mt CO2 % 
Emissions of addi-
tional installations (Mt 
CO2) 
                                                
59 In Germany: Sectors Energy and Industry from Energy Balances, therefore numbers in 
NAP II vary from our calculations: Hypothetical CO2 BS target 849, distribution between 
ETS and non-ETS is 515 and 334. 
60  In Germany: Sectors Energy and Industry from Energy Balances. 
61  The emission levels and targets changed compared to the data underlying NAP I because 
of adjustments in the national inventory NIR (see German Draft NAP 2008-12): NAP states 
967 Mt CO2e/a for Kyoto period. 
62  Draft NAP Germany (Data for 2004). 
63  UNFCCC 2006 data submitted by Germany states CO2 emissions for 2004 with 885.9 Mt 
CO2e/a. 
64  10 Mio t for new entrants, 2 Mio t to be sold to cover administrative costs of JI/CDM and 
KfW-mechanism 
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(2005) 
473.7 (99.8%) 21.3 (22.3) 4.3 (4.5) 11 
BP 
(years) 
BP  
(Mt 
CO2e/a) 
P2008-12  
(Mt 
CO2e/a) 
∆BP-P 
(Mt 
CO2e/a) 
GDP2003-10  
(%) 
GR2008-12  
NAP II (%) 
Base period (BP), 
projection (P), 
growth rates 
(GR) 
2000-2005 50965 NA NA 1.566 - 
Rationale for cap Not result of optimization approach; relies on cap and logic developed for NAP 2005-
2007, where cap for energy and industry sectors (from German energy balances) was 
outcome of political negotiations. 
Information on 
future ETS caps 
Yes: Cites European Councils target of at least minus 15-30% until 2020 for industrial-
ized countries, further states Environment Council's recommendations of minus 60-80% 
until 2050 for industrialized countries; German government aiming at EU Post-Kyoto 
target of -30% by 2020 (compared to 1990), if the EU commits to such a target, Germany 
will even further reduce its emissions. For this case, The Climate Protection Programme 
2005 sets a medium-term target of -40 %. As for all other sectors, the ETS budget for 
2013-2017 will reflect these future reduction targets, too. 
Micro-level plan (allocation rules) 
Opt-in / opt-out (Yes/No) # 2005-07 # 2008-12 Inclusion of additional installa-
tions 
2005-07 2008-12 
Installations 
covered (exclud-
ing opt-out and 
including opt-in) 
1849 tbd Yes: Crackers in chemical 
industry, etc. according to 
NAP II guidance (2005) 
No / No No / No 
Cost-free Allocation 
% Compliance Factor Growth Factor 
Auctioning 
Energy Indus-
try 
CHP Others Energy Indus-
try 
100 
0.85 0.9875 1 - None None 
No (but share of 
reserve is being 
sold) 
Allocation 
method for  
existing installa-
tions 
Based on annual average emissions in extended new base period 
of 2000-2005 (in NAP I: 2000-2002). 
KfW-mechanism 
and JI/CDM fees 
                                                
65  Average for 2000-2002, including 11 Mio t for additional installations. 
66  IEA/OECD (2005): Energy policies of IEA countries, 2005 Review. 
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Allocation 
method for  
new entrants 
100% cost-free allocation based on BAT-benchmarks and standardized utilisation rates67 
for electricity and heat generation; only two benchmarks are applied, one for gas-fired 
installations (365g CO2/kwh for electricity) and one for others (750g CO2/kwh for electric-
ity); no compliance factor will be applied to these allocation rules for 14 years. 
Standardized load factors fixed product- or technology-specific benchmarks for the pro-
duction of homogenous products: cement clinker (three different technologies), glass 
(two types of products), and bricks (four types of products); BAT standards for inhomo-
geneous products on the basis of a submission-of-proof procedure; no compliance factor 
will be applied to these allocation rules for 14 years.  
Transfer rule: Allowances from closed installations may be transferred to replacement 
installation for four years (afterwards no compliance factor will be imposed for 10 years). 
Note: Somewhat shorter and not identical binding allocation rules. 
Reserve 12 Mt CO2/a, of which 2 MtCO2 are being sold on the market to finance KfW-mechanism 
and to cover administration costs for JI/CDM. If reserve is depleted, it will be replenished 
through the market (see special features below). 
Closure rules No further allocation of allowances after closure exception: Transfer rule for replacement 
installations) operator has to declare closure; intention to include suitable measures in 
final NAP II. 
Special provi-
sions for energy-
efficient installa-
tions 
Combined heat and power (CHP) face less stringent compliance factor of 0.9875. 
Treatment of 
renewable en-
ergy sources 
Installations covered by Renewable Energy Act (benefit from feed-in tariffs for RES) are 
excluded from ETS. 
Use of 
ERUs/CERs by 
companies 
Max. 12% of allocation to each installation can be used at once or spread over trading 
period. 
Special features No specific new early action rule. 
No special treatment of existing combined heat and power (CHP) installations or proc-
ess-related emissions; both are considered to be recognized via a compliance factor of 
0.9875. 
Special treatment of small installations: Installation with average annual emissions of less 
than 25,000 t CO2 in the base period receive compliance factor of 1.0. 
No capacity utilisation adjustment rule; no ex-post adjustments. 
No special hardship clause (s) foreseen. 
No additional allowances as compensation for further phase-out of nuclear power. 
Reserve replenishment rule (as before): if needed additional allowances will be pur-
                                                
67  Because ex-post adjustment is ruled out in NAP guidance, standardized utilization rates 
were used rather than projected output as in the NAP for 2005-2007. 
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chased by the German reconstruction Bank (KfW) and distributed free of charge; the 
purchased quantity of allowances will be subtracted from the budget in the subsequent 
trading period and sold on the market (refinancing of KfW); in addition 2 Mt will be sold to 
cover administrative costs for CDM and JI projects and to finance the reserve replenish-
ment rule of NAP 2005-2007. 
Malus rule: Old inefficient coal and lignite power plants receive cuts of 15%. 
Closure rule: not yet specified. 
Information on 
future allocation 
rules 
No statement in Draft NAP of April 13, but in earlier versions benchmarking was men-
tioned as future allocation rule for existing installations. 
Comparison with 
first NAP 
No choice between allocation based on new entrant rule (options rule) and grandfather-
ing; special provisions for CHP are easier; no ex-post adjustments, nor special rules for 
process-related emissions, early action, phase out of nuclear, or hardship planned; only 
two benchmarks for new energy installations; system is less complex and more transpar-
ent, discrimination of compliance factor between energy installations and other installa-
tions; special compliance factor for small installations. 
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UNITED KINGDOM 
NAP 2005-2007 
Micro-level plan (allocation rules) 
Installations covered  
(share of CO2 emissions) 
674 (46%), no opt-in, opt-out up to 2007 for installations covered by UK emis-
sions trading scheme (63 installations) and opt-out up to 2008 for 330 installa-
tions covered by the climate change agreements.68 
Allocation method 
for 
existing installations 
100 % cost-free allocation. 
all sectors/subsectors (except for the energy sector) receive an allocation at the 
level of projected emissions (allocation according to estimated need). The en-
ergy sector receives the remaining allowances once other sectors allocations 
have been taken off the total cap.  
2-level allocation method  
Sector budget:  
Around 50 different sectors. Projected sector-specific emissions in 2005-2007 
were determined on the basis of historic emissions multiplied by growth rates. 
Allocation needed for new entrants have been subtracted. 
Allocation at installation level:  
Ratio of the installation's historic emissions to the sum of the sector's historic 
emissions multiplied by the sector budget.  
Base period: 1998-2003, excluding the year with the lowest emissions; if the 
installation commenced operation in the base period, the reference period is 
correspondingly shorter. 
Allocation method  
for 
new entrants 
 
Reserve 
New installations are installations, capacity extensions or closed installations 
that re-commence operation, which commence operation on/after 1 January 
2004. Allocation to be made cost-free from new entrants reserve, whilst there 
are still allowances remaining in the reserve. Capacity utilization in 2005-2007 is 
derived from uniform and subsector average figures determined ex ante.  
Allocation to be made on the basis of BAT benchmarks. 
Reserve for new entrants: 15.6 Mt CO2 p.a. (equivalent to 6% of the ETS 
budget). 
Will be distributed on a first-come-first-served basis and any allowances re-
maining at the end of the phase may be auctioned.  
Additional special allocation: CHP and late applicants.  
Transfers are possible in cases in which capacity utilization or production is 
transferred between one operator's installations (in the same sector) during the 
phase. Precondition: The installations must produce comparable products (same 
3-digit SIC code), the permit holder must be the same for both installations, the 
transferring installation must cease operations and at least 50% of the transfer-
ring installations production must be transferred. This rule does not apply to the 
power stations sector. 
                                                
68  EU Commission 2006: Commission decision of 23/XII/2005 concerning the temporary ex-
clusion of certain installations bet he United Kingdom, C(2005)5714final. 
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Treatment of Renewable 
Energy Sources (RES) 
No special treatment. 
Special Features 
Good quality CHP special ring-fenced new entrant reserve to ensure allocation 
for new entrants. 
No early action other than through the base period. 
 
 
UNITED KINGDOM 
NAP 2008-2012  
(Draft Version March 2006) 
Macro-level plan (emission targets and budgets) 
CO2,1990(Mt CO2e/a) (Hypothetical) CO2 BS target 
without Kyoto mechanisms (Mt 
CO2e/a) 
GHG1990/199
5 (Mt 
CO2e/a) 
ETS Non-ETS 
BS 
target 
(Mt 
CO2e/a
) 
BS 
(%) 
ETS Non-ETS 
NA NA 245.9 324.5 
Burden sharing 
target (BS) & ETS 
764.5 
590.2 
668.9 -12.5 
570.4 
CO2,2004(Mt CO2e/a) DTT2004 Mt CO2e/a GHG2004 
(Mt 
CO2e/a)  ETS Non-ETS 
KM 2008-12  
(Mt CO2e/a) 
without KM with KM 
242.4 319.8 
Emissions, dis-
tance-to-target 
(DTT), use of 
Kyoto mecha-
nisms (KM) by 
government 
659.3 
562.2 
0 9.6 9.6 
2005-07 2008-12 
R2005-07 R2008-12 ETS2005-07 cap includ-
ing R2005-07 (Mt 
CO2e/a) Mt CO2e/a % 
ETS2008-12 cap in-
cluding R2008-12 (Mt 
CO2e/a) Mt CO2e/a % 
ETS cap (both 
NAP I and II) & 
new entrant re-
serve (R)  
245.3 18.9 7.7 25269 17 6.7 
Difference to allocation for 
2005 
VET2005 Mt CO2  
(% of installations covered) 
Mt CO2 % 
Emissions of addi-
tional installations (Mt 
CO2) 
Verified emis-
sions (VET) of 
ETS-installations 
(2005) 
242.4 (99.9%) -33.1 (wrt 209.4) -15.8% max. 7.8  
(DEFRA 2006b) 
                                                
69  Only for the installations covered in phase 1 (but includes the opted-out installations since 
they have been covered from January 2007 onwards). For additional installations, cap still 
needs to be determined. The maximum cap will be around 261 Mt CO2 (6.5% of maximum 
cap=> 85 MtCO2 for reserve for a five year period). 
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BP 
(years) 
BP  
(Mt 
CO2e/a) 
P2008-12  
(Mt 
CO2e/a) 
∆BP-P 
(MtCO2
e/a) 
∆ GDP2003-10  
(%) 
GR2008-12  
NAP II (%) 
Base period (BP), 
projection (P), 
growth rates 
(GR) 
2000-200370 242.471 270.5 -28.1 372 Varying 
Rationale for cap The cap was set in line with new UK Climate Change Programme 2006, which is among 
others based on the following principles:  
- the need to take a balanced approach with all sectors and all parts of the UK playing 
their part; 
- the need to safeguard, and where possible enhance, the UKs competitiveness, en-
courage technological innovation, promote social inclusion and reduce harm to 
health. 
Information on 
future ETS caps 
No: But targets for 2050 (-60% CO2 reduction) with real progress by 2020. 
Comments ETS CO2 share: 50% all 6 GHG (projected for 2008-2012). 
Micro-level plan (allocation rules) 
Opt-in / Opt-out (Yes/No) # 2005-07 # 2008-12 Inclusion of additional instal-
lations 
2005-07 2008-12 
Installations cov-
ered (excluding 
opt-out and in-
cluding opt-in) 
1057 tbd Glass; mineral wool; gypsum; 
flaring from offshore oil and 
gas production; petrochemi-
cals (crackers); carbon black; 
integrated steelworks etc. 
(DEFRA 2006b) 
Opt-in: No 
Opt-out: Yes; 
59 install. in UK ETS, 329 
install. under climate 
change agreements. 
No 
Cost-free Allocation 
% Compliance Factor Growth Factor 
Auctioning 
Energy Indus-
try 
CHP Others Energy Industry 
Allocation 
method for  
existing installa-
tions 
90-98 
Bears 
reduction 
1 1 1 Yes Yes, varying 
for 17 sectors  
2-10% (sub-
tracted from 
energy-cap) 
                                                
70  Average of highest three years. In NAP I the base period was 1998-1999. However this 
early data is considered to be of poorest quality and incomplete, which is why none of the 
year was included. Data from 2004 was not included since there would have been consid-
erable costs involved in collecting the data or might have lead to perverse incentives.  
71  No data yet for the base period, therefore, as a proxy we use VET 2005 data for NAP I 
installations only. 
72  Source: IEA/OECD (2005): Energy policies of IEA countries, 2005 Review. 
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 2-level allocation method: 
Sector budget:  
- 17 different sectoral budgets (projected emissions) are set based on sectoral growth 
factors and reduction potential. A proportion is deducted for the new entrant reserve. 
- Total reduction (incl. auctioning) will be borne by electricity supply industry (ESI). All 
other sectors will receive allocation based on projected BAU emissions.  
Allocation at installation level: 
- Allocation for electricity supply industry will be based on a benchmark (and possibly 
for the brewing sector, as well): Individual plant's Transmission Entry Capacity (as 
given in national Grid's Seven Year Statement 2005 sub-sector) X standard load fac-
tor X sub-sector standard emission factor (efficiency factor X fuel emissions factor).  
Five different technologies are distinguished.73  
- All other sectors are allocated based on a share of relevant emissions of an installa-
tion in the base period (2000-2003) multiplied by total available allowances of the 
sector (see step 1). Good quality CHP (GQ CHP) will be based on 2001-2003 emis-
sions. 
Allocation 
method for  
new entrants 
New entrants are installations that open during 2008-2012 or that start operating in later 
phase 1 (after 30 June 2006). Allocation will be based on BAT benchmarks, some of 
which have been revised from those under phase 1. The majority of new entrant bench-
marks assume use of gas and electricity supply industry benchmark is CCGT. 
 
It is proposed that non-ESI and non-GQ CHP new entrants will receive 95% of the allow-
ances allocated based on spreadsheets. ESI new entrants will receive 90% or same cut 
in allocation as ESI incumbents, whichever is greater. GQ CHP will receive 100% of allo-
cation based on calculation by the spreadsheet. 
Reserve The New Entrant Reserve is made up of contributions from each of the 17 sectors. An 
indicative figure given in NAP II is 85 Mt CO2e, which is 6.7% of allocation. However, the 
final size is not decided yet. 11 MtCO2e may be used for late phase 1 new entrants (start 
after 30th of June 2006). 
Treatment of 
closures 
An installation is considered to have ceased production when: 
1) The installation ceased operating  
2) Capacity of installation dropped below thresholds of Annex I in Directive. 
Permanently closed installations will retain allowances for the year in which the closure 
occurs but will not be issued allowances for the years after closure. 
Same transfer rule (called rationalization rule) as in phase 1 is proposed. This rule states 
that if one installation has closed and operations are moved to another installation or 
installations, the operator may apply to continue to receive a percentage of the allow-
ances from the closed installation. 
Treatment of 
renewable en-
ergy sources 
Combustion of biomass and waste material are mentioned as reduction options and their 
use should be enhanced due to benchmarking based on gas. 
                                                
73  Gas-fired generators; coal-fired generators that have opted in to the Large Combustion 
Plants Directive by 3 February 2006; coal-fired generators that opted out of the Large 
Combustion Plants Directive by 30 June 2004 and have not opted back in by 3 February 
2006; nonGoodQuality CHP (GQ CHP) capacity at CHP plants and others. 
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Use of 
ERUs/CERs by 
companies 
Not quantified yet but the proposal is to base it on the level of effort (allocation compared 
to BAU). The limit will most likely be set annually with banking between years. It has not 
yet been decided if the limit will be based on national, installation or sector level. 
Special features 
Good Quality Combined Heat and Power (GQ CHP): To give a strong incentive to invest 
in this kind of clean technology. Growth rates and a ring-fenced reserve are set in order 
to ensure favorable treatment of GQ CHP. In addition, GH CHP will receive 100% of the 
amount of allowances calculated by the spreadsheets. The allocation will be based on 
2001-2003 emission data after dropping the lower year of emissions.  
 
Contingency reserve of most likely less than 1% in order to provide flexibility (e.g., if ad-
ministrative error in allocation, late issuance of permit). Rest will be transferred in new 
entrant reserve. 
Information on 
future allocation 
rules 
No statement in Draft NAP of March 2006. 
Comparison with 
first NAP 
Approach relatively similar to NAP I but now includes benchmarking element for electric-
ity supply sector and auctioning.  
 
 
References: 
DEFRA 2006a: Consultation on the phase II UK Draft National Allocation Plan.  
DEFRA 2006b: EU Emissions Trading Scheme phase II (2008-2012) Expansion  Ex-
planatory Note 
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NETHERLANDS 
NAP 2005-2007 
Micro-level plan (allocation rules) 
Installations covered  
(share of CO2 emissions) 
There were 152 opt-outs (9 combustion sites and sites <25kt;  an additional149 
small emitters still await opt-out approval from EC). 
Allocation method 
for 
existing installations 
100 % cost-free allocation 
- Historic emissions X growth factor (per sub sector) X efficiency factor 
(benchmark) X compliance factor (0.97). 
- Compliance factor of 0.97 is without reserve because allocation formula 
contains a growth figure. 
- Base period is 2000-2001 unless company can prove that these years were 
not representative. 
Allocation method  
for 
new entrants 
Cost free allocation according to BAT benchmark as applied worldwide 
- Known new entrants receive allocation from sector budgets, are included in 
NAP I. 
- Unknown new entrants receive allocation from reserve (4 Mt). 
Special provisions for 
energy-efficient installa-
tions 
- Via benchmark: EE factor is maximum 1.1. 
- Double benchmark for existing CHP installations. 
Treatment of renewable 
energy sources (RES) 
Due to Coals Covenant, amount of CO2 avoided is subtracted from allocation via 
co-fired biomass.  
Special features 
- Compliance factor is applied to process related emissions. 
- De minimis rule regarding sites with <25kt (opt out). 
- Allowances for energetically usable blast furnace gas (Hoogovengas) are 
allocated to final user. 
- Closure rule: Not clear; commitment to address this in next NAP and legisla-
tion. 
- EC Decision July 7 accepts NAP, provided cut of 3 Mt, to 95.3 Mt. 
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NETHERLANDS 
NAP 2008-2012 
(Draft Version of May 23rd 2006; comments deadline on July 4th74) 
Macro-level plan (emission targets and budgets) 
CO2,1990(Mt CO2/a) (Hypothetical) CO2 BS target 
without Kyoto mechanisms (Mt 
CO2e/a) 
GHG1990/199
5 (Mt 
CO2e/a) 
ETS Non-ETS 
BS target 
(Mt 
CO2e/a) 
BS 
(%) 
ETS Non-ETS 
NA NA 73.9 75 92.276 
Burden sharing 
target (BS) & ETS 
212.9 
159.477 
200.2 -6 
166.1 
CO2,2004(Mt CO2e/a) DTT2004 Mt CO2e/a GHG2004  
(Mt 
CO2e/a) ETS Non-ETS 
KM 2008-12  
(Mt CO2e/a) 
without KM with KM 
80.4 100.3 
Emissions, dis-
tance-to-target 
(DTT), use of 
Kyoto mecha-
nisms (KM) by 
government 
217.8 
180.7 
20 
(JI: 34;  
CDM: 67) 
-17.6 2.6 
2005-07 2008-12 
R2005-07 R2008-12 ETS2005-07 cap includ-
ing R2005-07 (Mt 
CO2e/a) Mt CO2e/a % 
ETS2008-12 cap in-
cluding R2008-12  
(Mt CO2e/a) Mt CO2e/a % 
ETS cap (both 
NAP I and II) & 
new entrant re-
serve (R) 
95.978 2.5 2.6 99.279 680 6 
Difference to allocation for 
2005 
VET2005 Mt CO2  
(% of installations covered) 
Mt CO2 % 
Emissions of addi-
tional installations (Mt 
CO2) 
Verified emis-
sions (VET) of 
ETS-installations 
(2005) 
80.35181 (100%) 6.1 (using 86.5) 7 12-14 
                                                
74  See NAP II. 
75  Draft NAP II, page 27, table 2-1: 108.8 Mt CO2/a. 
76  Draft NAP II, page 23, table 1-2: 119.2 Mt CO2/a. 
77  See UNFCCC 2006. 
78  NAP II: Cap including ETS/Non-ETS was 112 Mt. In fact, due to opt-outs only 86.5 Mt was 
allocated. 
79  That is including additional sits, opt-outs. 
80  There is an additional legal claims depot of 0.5 Mt/a. 
81  See VET NL 2005. 
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BP 
(years) 
BP  
(Mt 
CO2e/a) 
P2008-12  
(Mt 
CO2e/a) 
∆PP-P 
(Mt 
CO2e/
a) 
∆ BIP2003-10  
(%) 
GR2008-12  
NAP II (%) 
Base period (BP), 
projection (P), 
growth rates 
(GR) 
Average of 3 
out of: 2000-
2005 
92.882 99.183 -6.3 2.984 1.785 
Rationale for cap Benchmarking covenant is main driver for cap (15% EE in 2010), assuming that emission 
trends are de-linked from economic growth. There is a small shift to non-ETS. A large 
use of KM is needed to meet Kyoto. 
Information on 
future ETS caps 
No: Only 2°C target. 
Comments Government is preparing extra measures to meet Kyoto: 6 Mt in non-ETS sector (energy 
saving in building; increase use of biofuels for cars to 5.57%; fiscal clean car purchase 
incentive) and 1. 4 Mt in ETS sectors.86 
Micro-level plan (allocation rules) 
Opt-in/opt-out (Yes/No) Installations 
covered 
# 2005-07 # 2008-12 Inclusion of additional instal-
lations 
2005-07 2008-12 
                                                
82  ETS participants average inventory report for 2001 and 2002 (92.6 resp. 93Mt, excluding 
process emissions: 78.6 resp. 79.3), from ECN 2006a. 
83  Own calculation, based on share of ETS-CO2 emissions (VET 2005) relative to national 
GHG emissions (2004) and projection of national GHG emissions of 224 Mt CO2e for 2010 
(95% certainty [MNP]); that is 2 Mt above target, with policy. Without policy it would be 246 
Mt in 2010. 
84  Source: IEA/OECD (2005): Energy policies of IEA countries, 2005 Review. 
85  1.7% CO2 growth, for all sectors on average, ECN 2006b. 
86  MNP 2006. 
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(excluding opt-
out, including 
opt-in) 
210 50087 
- Crackers etc (14) 
- 2 Carbon Black (0.3) 
- Off-gas process emission 
from desulphur. installa-
tions from coal-fired 
power 
- 2 plus 1 new entry  acid 
producers, 50% of N2O 
(1.6) 
- 80-100 horticulture green-
houses with >20MWth 
(2Mt) 
- Hospitals, universities 
with CHP (0.25)88 
Opt-out:  
Yes: 152 (9 
combust. 
and <25kt 
sites, 149 
small emit-
ters still 
await opt-out 
approval) 
Opt-in: No: 
(Though 
some denied 
opt-out pro-
vision) 
- Opt-in: Sites 
with linked 20 
MWth (instead of 
single installa-
tions) may opt-in 
- Opt-in: N2O for 
saltpetre produc-
tion for 50% of its 
CO2e (Art 24 Di-
rective): 1.6 Mt/a 
allocation 
Cost-free allocation 
% Compliance factor Growth factor 
Auctioning 
Energy Indus-
try 
CHP Others Energy Indus-
try 
Allocation 
method for  
existing installa-
tions 
96 
0.8689 0.8690 0.86 1 
small 
install-
ation 
1.7 1.7 
4% 
(or sold [3.9 Mt]); 
this is 10% of the 
power sector cap 
and 2/3 of the 15% 
windfall allowance 
correction of the 
power sector 
                                                
87  That amounts to 90% of energy/industry emissions. NL small companies provision: NAP 2 
will include sites with single 20MWth; in NAP 1 it could also be linked 10MWth. When com-
panies want to participate they can use an opt-in provision. It will be up to the EC to accept 
the narrower 20MWth approach and the opt-in. This will mean that 100 horticulture sites 
that are thought to participate in ETS (Agreement May 12) are not included. 
88  ECN 2006 a. 
89  NAP II proposes that the calculated allocation will be shortened with 15% over the net elec-
tricity delivered to the grid minus purchased electricity. This threshold is the first 350 GWh, 
so most CHP installations are excluded of 15% cut. But it appears that a handful of the 
largest (joint venture) CHP plants will be included. The destination and compensation will 
be as follows: 2/3 of the 15% will benefit small users/households (later to be decided how) 
through the sale of est. 4% of the overall allocation; 1/3 of the 15% (2%) will be allocated to 
the other ETS participants, based on electricity used (data for that are asked).  
90  50% of the process emissions will be excluded. 
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- Allocation=HE X GF X EE X C X sb: Historic emissions (average of 3 out of 2001-
2005) * growth (2005-2010) * relative energy efficiency * correction factor * sector 
specific special circumstances. 
- Requirements: Environment permit or notification; concrete building plans; official 
Board investment approval within 6 months after EUA request. 
- Growth: For 2005-2010 is CO2 related growth, based on May 2006 ECN projec-
tions.91 ECN has taken into account closures and new entrants in a sector to come 
with average growth of 1.76%.  
- Benchmark is determined by:  
- 1) EE=distance to world top by Benchmarking Covenant; assessment is confiden-
tially done by VBE.92 Energy efficiency is maximised at 15%, so EE can be max 
1.15.  
- 2) Energy Efficiency Agreement,93 EE=1; companies that do not participate in 1) or 
2) get EE=0.85: 15% energy efficiency is assumed in 2008-20012 regarding 2001-
2005.  
- 3) For CHP, default EEs are used (gas/oil: 52% [E], 90% [heat]; coal 39%/90%; Hoo-
goven gas 40%/90%.  
- 4) For process emissions EE=1 (plus correction factor is applied for 50%). Specific 
sector circumstances can be: 50% correction application for process emissions and 
power companies that implement the Coal Covenant (co-firing biomass) means that 
the allocation will be reduced with the co-firing part due to the existing Coal Covenant 
(to implement RE Directive). 
Allocation 
method for  
new entrants 
- Coverage: Sites active after Dec. 2006, not sites that received opt-out under NAP I 
(these will be treated as existing sites). Physical growth means new units within site. 
Threshold @ 50kt/a or 10% of capacity.  
- Allocation on basis of best practice and expected emissions, but max. 90% of official 
design (name plate) capacity. No correction factor; no growth factor. New power 
companies will not be affected by cap to address windfall profits. 
- Transfer provision: When the production of site A moves to site B within NL within the 
same company (as in Art. 24b Civil Code), the company can keep the EUAs, pro-
vided the production of site B increases with 10% growth or 50kt CO2. 
Reserve 
- 30 Mt, 6 Mt/a on first-come-first-served basis. 
- NL will look for ways to replenish the depot when emptied. It will be filled with unused 
reserve for legal claims and unused allowances after closures. 
- Legal claims depot is 0.5 Mt/a. 
Closure rules Closure means not meeting criteria of Art 16.5, 1 Environment Act (no monitoring of 
emission etc.); NEA can withdraw CO2 permit, then no more allowances will be issued. 
Unissued allowances will be added to new entrant depot. 
Special provi-
sions for energy-
efficient installa-
tions 
- Dealt with in general allocation method. 
- New entrants should apply BAT. 
- Saltpetre industry should apply below BAT. 
Treatment of 
renewable en-
ergy sources 
No provision. Power companies are treated on energy efficiency/capacity, not on 
CO2/kWh. Newcomers on BAT.  
                                                
91  ECN 2006b. 
92  www.benchmarking-energie.nl  
93  www.senternovem.nl/mja  
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Use of 
ERUs/CERs by 
companies 
8% of quota; unclear whether this is for application per annum or if companies are free to 
use it, e.g., in one year at once. When other MS will apply other percentage, percentage 
will be reconsidered. NL not JI host country. 
Special features 
- 15% cut of power companies quota (not for new entrants; see above). 
- Allocation for N2O installations will be based on benchmark in gg N2O/ton of 100% 
saltpetre X U GWP X growth; benchmark cap will be lower than BAT cap; NL will add 
N2O monitoring protocol. When benchmark is not ready, entry into force may be later 
than Jan. 2008. Allocation = P (average production 3 of 2001-2005 X 100% saltpe-
tre) X Benchmark (1.7 kg/t 100% Salp.) X GWP (310) X Growth 1.7 (though NAP 
says no growth rate for N2O allocation. The N2O new entrant depot is 1.3 Mt, legal 
claims depot is 0.032: Total available: 7.75 Mt EUA/a.  
Information on 
future allocation 
rules 
Not in NAP. But Minister of Economic Affairs Brinkhorst wrote in a May 24 letter to Euro-
pean Commission (Green Paper EE) that he prefers for future allocation:  
- A continuation of the ETS after 2012; 
- Needed changes in the system: Harmonization of allocation for new and existing 
sites, limit free allocation to the power sector to tackle 'windfall profits' and to take 
into account the value of CO2 storage and nuclear energy; 
- Extension of EU ETS to aviation, marine transport and non CO2 gases.  
Comparison with 
first NAP 
Difficult to compare. Looks more stringent. More companies are included. Some addi-
tions take own CO2 space (N2O, CO2 in horticulture; CO2 from buildings). Reserve of 
30Mt is mainly for new coal power plants (no sustainable signal). To limit the inclusion of 
20MWth to sites with at least a single 20MWth might not be accepted by EC.  
References 
- NAP-2, the Netherlands, May 23rd:  
http://www.senternovem.nl/mmfiles/Ontwerp%20Allocatieplan%20NAP-II_tcm24-
188483.pdf    
- UNFCCC 2006: Netherlands Report to the UNFCCC on Demonstrable Progress 
under Art. 3.2. Kyoto Protocol  Feb06 
- VET NL: Verified Emissions Report, see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/pdf/citl_netherlands.pdf 
- ECN 2006a: Allocation for CAP, May 2006: 
www.ecn.nl/docs/library/report/2006/c06030.pdf  
- ECN 2006b: ECN, Groeicijfers voor CAP, May 2006: 
http://www.ecn.nl/docs/library/report/2006/c06031.pdf  
- MNP2006: Milieubalans 2006., May 2006 
- NIR / CRF 2006 for the Netherlands, UNFCCC (all data not further specified is 
taken from UNFCCC 2006 
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Annex B: Analysis of verified emission data for 2005 
On 15 May the European Commission released the 2005 CO2 emissions data and 
compliance status of more than 9,400 installations covered by the EU ETS from 21 
Member States.94 The published data show a surplus of about 44 m EUAs (compared 
to total emissions by these installations of about 1,785.3 m EUAs for 2005). Thus, the 
surplus of allowances for these installations amounts to about 2.5 %. With the an-
nouncement of Luxembourgs surplus of 0.6 Mt CO2e, the EU surplus comes to 44.6 m,  
2.4% of its total allocated EUAs (CEC 2006b). 
The situation for the countries covered in this report is as follows: With a surplus of 
about 21 m EUAs, Germany exhibits the largest surplus of all MS in terms of quantity. 
In relative terms, the surplus accounts for 4.3 % of the German ET-budget, which is 
also well above average. In relative terms, the surplus of 6.2 m EUAs in the Nether-
lands is even larger (6.6 % of ET-budget). By contrast, with a shortage of 36.4 m EUAs 
(or 15.8 % of the ET-budget) installations in the UK exhibit the largest shortage in ab-
solute values.  
B.1 Analysis for Germany 
Figure B-1 indicates that on average, all activities in Germany enjoyed a surplus of 
allowances. The highest relative surplus is found in the production of cellulose (only 
four installations). The surplus of energy installations (combustion installations in the 
energy and industry sectors), which are responsible for the vast majority of emissions 
(about 80%) and of installations (about 2/3), amounts to 9.5 m EUAs, or 2.5% of total 
EUAs allocated to these installations. By comparison, installations in all activities in the 
industry sector (i.e., excluding energy installations) account for about 33% of installa-
tions and 20% of allocated EUAs. The surplus of these installations is approximately 
11.1 m EUAs, which corresponds to 10.6 % of total allocation to these installations 
(DEHSt 2006). A more detailed analysis of the underlying sources for the surplus by 
the German Emissions Trading Authority (DEHSt) reveals that the installations that 
received their allocation based on the options rule are responsible for more than half 
the surplus in Germany (DEHSt 2006, p. 16). 
Overall, for the first year of the EU ETS about 2/3 of all installations in Germany re-
ceived more allowances than they surrendered, while about 1/3 of all installations were 
short.  
                                                
94 Since the registries of Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and Poland were not operational, instal-
lations from these MS are not included in this report.  
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Figure B-1: Surplus of allowances by activity in percent of allocated quantities of EUAs 
in Germany 
Surplus of allowances by activity in percent (DE 2005)
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Source: Fraunhofer ISI based on DEHSt (2006) 
B.2 Analysis for the UK 
Figure B.2 reflects that the UK allocation for the first trading period is by design more 
stringent on the energy sector95 than on the industry sectors. Energy installations face 
an average deficit of almost 20%, corresponding to a total of over 35 m EUAs, while 
the non-energy installations enjoy an average surplus of about 9%, corresponding to a 
total of around 47 M EUAs. Overall, for the first year of the EU ETS slightly more than 
half the installations in the UK received more allowances than they had emitted. A sec-
toral analysis shows that about half the energy installations face a deficit. In the iron 
and steel sector, this share is 90%, and in the other industry sectors (besides Other) it 
is around 70% (see Figure B-3). 
                                                
95 The terms energy and industry sector as used in this report do not exactly correspond to 
the underlying concepts in the Directive. For example, the energy sector would also include 
energy installations in industry such as CHP plants. 
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Figure B-2: Surplus/deficit of allowances by activity in percent of allocated quantities of 
EUAs in the UK 
Surplus/deficit of allowances by activity in percent 
(UK 2005)
-50
-30
-10
10
30
50
70
90
C
om
bustion
R
efineries
Iron and
S
teel
C
em
ent
and Lim
e
G
lass
C
eram
ics
P
aper and
P
ulp
O
ther
Sector
 
Source: Fraunhofer ISI based on Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) (CEC 2006c) 
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Figure B-3: Share of installations with a surplus or a deficit of EUAs by activity in the 
UK for 2005 
Share of installations with surplus / deficit by activity 
(UK 2005)
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Source: Fraunhofer ISI based on Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) (CEC 
2006c). 
Comparing the size of installations (as measured by the allocated quantities of EUAs) 
to the surplus or deficits in the UK (see Figure B-4) implies that both the smallest and 
the largest installations show the largest deficits. The distribution as measured in terms 
of share of installations with a surplus resembles an inverse U.   
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Figure B-4: Share of installations with a surplus or a deficit of EUAs by size in  UK for 
2005 
Share of installations with surplus / deficit by size (UK 2005)
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Source: Fraunhofer ISI based on Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) (CEC 
2006c). 
B.3 Analysis for the Netherlands 
Figure B.5 reflects that the Netherlands allocation for the first trading period is some-
what more stringent on the energy sector than on the industry sectors. In terms of 
stringency for the energy sector, the allocation ranges between the rather generous 
allocation in Germany and the relatively tight allocation in UK. Energy installations in 
the Netherlands face an average deficit of slightly more than 2.5 %, which corresponds 
to a total deficit of around 1.4 m EUAs. By comparison, non-energy installations enjoy 
an average surplus of almost 26%, owing in particular to the huge surplus for the instal-
lations in the emissions-intensive iron and steel industries. The total surplus for non-
energy installations is approximately 7.5 m EUAs. 
Overall, for the first year of the EU ETS almost three quarters of the installations in the 
Netherlands received more allowances than they had emitted. Figure B-6 shows that 
the sectors with the highest shares of installations with a deficit are combustion installa-
tions in the energy and industry sectors and the installations in the ceramics sector. All 
installations in the iron and steel industries and in the cement industry enjoyed a sur-
plus, due to a smaller-than-anticipated growth in 2005. 
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Figure B-5: Surplus/deficit of allowances by activity in percent of allocated quantities of 
EUAs in the Netherlands 
Surplus/deficit of allowances by activitity in percent 
(NL 2005)
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Source: Fraunhofer ISI based on Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) (CEC 
2006c). 
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Figure B-6: Share of installations with a surplus or a deficit of EUAs by activity in the 
Netherlands for 2005 
Share of installations with surplus / deficit by activitity 
(NL 2005)
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Source: Fraunhofer ISI based on Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) (CEC 
2006c). 
As in the UK, the size of installations with the surplus or deficits (see Figure B-7 in An-
nex B) shows that the allocation in tithe Netherlands appears to have regressive ef-
fects: The larger the installation, the larger the surplus.  
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Figure B-7: Share of installations with a surplus or a deficit of EUAs by size in the 
Netherlands for 2005 
Share of installations with surplus / deficit by size (NL 2005)
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Source: Fraunhofer ISI based on Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) (CEC 
2006c). 
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